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Abstract
Shared infrastructure computing has become ubiquitous; from the smallest start-up de-
ploying on a multi-tenant cloud to the largest corporations whose separate branches all
deploy to a shared private cloud. In both cases, the security challenges are similar and
are unique from the legacy model of deploying monolithic applications on dedicated hard-
ware. In the case of a multi-tenant cloud deployment, attacks can stem from other tenants
who are not part of the same security domain, be that a different security-level within a
single organization, or distinct organizations on a public cloud. In addition to nearly ubiq-
uitous adoption of shared infrastructure, the rise of so called “micro-services” poses a set
of unique challenges and advantages to security. The micro-service moniker stems from the
idea of a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) with a focus on having a small code base
for each component of an application. The SOA approach is complimented by the DevOps
movement in which software development practices are being applied to operations. These
development and deployment techniques are here to stay as they enable more thorough test-
ing, reliable deployment, and scalability that previous software architectures only supported
with extensive rewriting. In this dissertation, we focus on providing security to this new
paradigm of computing. These trends force us to face security challenges unique to cloud
computing such as passive cache-based side-channel attacks. In addition to new challenges,
this new paradigm also affords us better tools and services due to the well-defined behavior
of micro-services. Here, we focus on mitigating security risks by leveraging the Principle
of Least Privilege (PoLP) at every layer of the stack: the interface between the operating
system and the hardware, the system call interface, and within individual applications. We
implement the PoLP through layer specific capabilities by mapping the security challenges
present in cloud computing to a Take-Grant relational model between subjects. We concep-
tually extend the notion of “subject” to include subjects at every layer of the cloud stack.
ii
Additionally, we explore adding more trust guarantees to subject relationship monitoring.
Finally, we explore fine grained memory operations within a micro-service that can impact
a micro-service’s relationships with other subjects in the system.
iii
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Current implementations of the cloud computing paradigm leave users vulnerable to at-
tack. Efforts have been made to make individual components more secure by patching
vulnerabilities [1] or modifying cloud management frameworks [2]. Despite individual efforts
to secure specific components, services deployed on cloud architectures remain exposed to
attack. We argue this is because the PoLP is not being applied holistically to the entire
stack. For cloud deployments to achieve their desired level of security, a capability based
implementation of the PoLP must be applied at every layer of the stack.
Cloud computing emerged to reduce the costs of running services through the use of
dynamic scaling and pay-per-use pricing models with per-hour billing, allowing a business
or business units within a organization to treat computing resources as a utility [3]. NIST
has defined on-demand self-service, rapid elasticity and measured service as 3 of 5 essential
characteristics of cloud computing [4]. We highlight these characteristics because we believe
they have played a major role in the adoption of cloud. These features make deploying
scalable services easier and more cost effective than was previously possible. On-demand
self-service allows a business or organizational unit to deploy new services without a lengthy
equipment acquisition process. Combining this with rapid elasticity enables organizational
units to deploy and scale their offerings without large amounts of management overhead.
Measured service allows businesses to only pay for the time they use. This means that
organizations can now iterate faster and with less risk without worrying about paying for
the possibility of scaling. Organizational units will be charged more only when necessary,
at a point when a service’s value is likely to exceed the costs of scaling. The economics of
scale afforded to shared-infrastructure cloud computing environments available today make
offering such features a viable business [5]. These scalability advantages have driven the
move to independently scalable components, or micro-services.
There are many shared infrastructure offerings for services targeting the public cloud,
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private clouds, and hybrid clouds which leverage public clouds for scaling needs [4]. In
this context, we use public/private/hybrid-cloud to mean Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS)
and Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) built on top [4, 6]. IaaS is most often used to deploy and
scale Virtual Machines (VMs). Amazon’s Elastic-Compute-Cloud [7] and Google’s Compute
Engine [8] are both examples of public clouds, though there are numerous more from various
vendors [9–11]. More discussion on PaaS is in Section 2.2.4. In the context of a public cloud,
the shared-infrastructure is multi-tenant. A VM from one organization may be co-scheduled
on a single physical host as another organization’s VM.
Private clouds initially seem to solve the security risks with multi-tenant public clouds by
allowing an organization to host shared infrastructure for different business units company
wide. Large companies can host their internal cloud utilizing a variety of private cloud stacks
and make resources available to each business unit. OpenStack, co-developed by NASA
and Rackspace, is one of the leading examples of software being used to deploy private
clouds [12]. The same features are available in a private cloud: business units can spin-
up virtual resources without a separate acquisition process, can dynamically scale-out, and
fine grained measurements are still taken on “customer” resources usage. “Customer” here
refers to a business unit within the larger organization. This allows a company to track the
spending of various branches and possibly pass the costs through to different cost centers. In
a private cloud, only a single company’s VMs will run on the shared infrastructure. This does
not eliminate the security risks associated with shared-infrastructure as multi-tenancy has
been traded for multi-level clouds. Organizations divide their data and compute jobs based
on risk and compliance needs. One business unit may be processing Payment Card Industry
(PCI) data and thus need to meet or exceed PCI Data Security Standards [13]. Other
organizations may be serving the needs of competing clients who may have services deployed
on the shared-infrastructure of the firm. One could envision a situation in which one client
tried to disrupt the service of another by leveraging the shared nature of the service-providing
firm’s private cloud. Government units need to provide various classification levels to data
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and resources. The Department of Defense’s Trusted Compute System Evaluation Criteria
(TCSEC) (i.e., the Orange Book) defines 4 such levels, each of which is further broken down
into categories. When utilizing shared-infrastructures, even in the form of private-clouds,
governments and organizations still need to be able to provide security isolation between
services running on the infrastructure.
The rise of cloud computing has been accompanied by a growth in SOA’s in the form of
so called “micro-services” - pieces of software intended to provide the smallest granularity of
functionality in the scope of a larger application goal. While no official definition of a micro-
service exists, we will use the community definition popularized on the web [14] and from
Sam Newman’s book on building micro-services [15]. Micro-services are developed in a way
that favors horizontal scaling and can be deployed independently of one-another regardless
of whether or not they depend on data from another micro-service. It is common to de-
ploy a micro-service oriented cloud application using containers or virtual appliances (VAs),
VMs tuned for a single service. Micro-services are being used by small organizations and
startups and large established companies such as Netflix [16]. The micro-service approach
compliments a new trend toward programmatic operations units in a movement known as
“DevOps”. The goal is to make deployment of services as repeatable as possible by utilizing
the same development and testing techniques used in software development. Micro-services
often follow what is known as the “12-factor” approach to software development [17]: they
tend to be side-effect free, rely on external configuration and scale horizontally. The DevOps
movement, the ability to treat computing as a utility through shared-infrastructures, and
micro-services are clearly here to stay and are driving the adoption of both VAs and con-
tainers to quickly deploy and scale isolated services. Security considerations must be made
that take into account the challenges and advantages afforded applications developed using
this new paradigm.
Computing on shared infrastructure poses numerous challenges to security. We separate
these security challenges into two categories: 1) Those stemming from stateful hardware (e.g.,
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side-channels) and those stemming from active attacks on micro-services (e.g., an exploit for a
particular vulnerability). The latter category can be divided into coarse grained attacks and
fine grained attacks. Coarse grained attacks are those focused on execution of near-normal
behavior, such as opening a configuration file containing application secrets. On the other
hand, fine grained memory attacks allow Turing-complete execution within the compromised
binary. We explore capabilities for PoLP enforcement at every layer of the stack by adding
capabilities to access stateful hardware to mitigate passive attacks, adding more trust to
relationship monitoring for coarse grained attacks, and by producing instruction to memory
access capability lists for fine grained attacks.
For side-effect based attacks, we extend the concept of a capability for containers, a popular
deployment target for many of today’s micro-services, to include the shared cache used by
a given service. Direct attacks can be detected using a variety of methods. We begin by
exploring the limitations of existing dynamic probing mechanisms that can be used to probe
relationship creation functions inside of a guest-kernel on top of which a micro-service is
deployed. We add more trust to subject-relation monitoring systems. We then produce an
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that leverages the minimized nature of micro-services to
enable manageable whitelists - enforcing capabilities based on observed behavior.
Despite being able to detect capability violations by leveraging probing mechanisms, there
are still a large number of attacks that stay intra-process that will go undetected. Consider a
micro-service that handles credit card data. Using a probing based approach, we could detect
that the service was maliciously writing customer information to a file to be transferred to
the attacker, a capability it was not granted. On the other hand, the attack would go
undetected if the attacker siphoned customer information out of the service by embedding
it into otherwise legitimate requests. This is more typical of what is known as an Advance
Persistent Threats a type of malware that resides in a system over a long period of time.
To combat these kinds of attacks, we build fine-grained capability lists through the use of a
novel provenance engine for type unsafe code bases.
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We argue that all of these issues can be addressed by utilizing the PoLP, but that it must
be applied at every layer. In this dissertation we apply the PoLP at the hardware level,
the systems level, and at the application level to mitigate both direct and indirect attacks
through the use of capabilities. We enforce the PoLP to eliminate side channel attacks on the
cache at the hardware level through the novel use of hardware enforced spacing separation
and software enforced temporal separation of micro-services to provide a cache-access capa-
bility. We add additional trust for capability monitoring at the system level. The reduced
behavior of micro-services is utilized to improve the manageability of whitelists to enforce
the PoLP at the interface between applications and the operating system. This can stop cer-
tain attacker payloads and detect misconfigurations along with insider threats. The systems
boundary is coarse-grained. Advanced exploits require that the PoLP be applied within the
micro-service (intra-application). We build a provenance engine so that capabilities can be
produced for memory regions within an application.
1.1 CAPABILITIES
Capabilities were first introduced by Dennis et al. [18] and further refined by Jones [19].
Jones discusses only giving subjects the minimal rights required to accomplish a given pro-
grammed goal - today we call this concept the Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP). In dis-
cussing capabilities, Jones explores the notion of taking and granting capabilities for subjects
to access objects. Jones et al. go on to formalize this subject-object relationship in “A linear
time algoirhtm for deciding security” [20]. This model of security was refined by reducing the
entity types from subject-object’s to subjects by Lipton et al. [21] in what became known as
the Take-Grant model of security. Lipton et al. explore the notion of relationships between
subjects as highlighted by Table 1.1. Bishop et al. extended the notion of Take-Grant to
capture capabilities on de facto information transfer [22]. More recently, the Take-Grant
model of security has been used to formally verify the seL4 micro-kernel, demonstrating the
5
scalability and applicability of the approach to production quality code bases [23]. Recently,
there has been efforts to transition commodity operating systems to include stricter notions
of capabilities through sand-boxing techniques [24]. Instead of focusing on just capabilities
at the operating systems level, we focus on a cross-section of capabilities spanning the entire
stack leveraged in cloud-deployment of micro-services. We have modernized the notation
used in [21] and denote the group of subjects accessed by subject α as Sα. Note that our
usage of the word “accessed” is imprecise - the term in this context simply means there
exists a relationship between two subjects. The nature of that relationship is dependent on
the exact application at hand. It may mean reading a file, writing a file, executing a binary,
accessing a given memory region, memory page, or other operating system construct. In a
web application, “subjects” may be application level users and they may have relationships
with other application level constructs - all of which may be represented in an application
database. In this dissertation, we explore extending the concept of “subject” to simulta-
neously include stateful hardware, coarse grained system actions, and fine grained memory
accesses within an application.
Table 1.1: Subject Security
Definition of Term
Sα Subject Domain for process α
R A relation between two subjects
α R β Process α is related to β through relation R
To further clarify our usage of the term “subject-domain” consider two subjects α and β
related to one another through relation R as shown in Table 1.1. Afterwards, α ∈ Sβ and
β ∈ Sα. Capabilities are built around relationships; for example, a subject may have the
capability to use R to modify its security domain S.
We leverage a functional model of micro-services that treats the service as a function whose
execution produces side-effects on the function’s subject-domain. We model a micro-service
as a function g(x, y) on program arguments x and the environment in which it executes, y.
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The side-effects on the subject-domain are relationships R1, R2, ..., Rn. Capabilities are
applied at the relationship level. To address passive attacks, we extend the notion of a subject
to include cache regions and grant the capability to access a given region to a single security
domain at a time. Mechanisms to monitor relationships stemming from system actions for
VAs already exist - we explore making these monitors more trustworthy. To conclude, we
address the limitations in coarse-grained subject-relationship monitoring by extending the
definition of subjects to include individual memory instructions and the memory regions
they access to produce fine grained capabilities lists to be applied within g(x, y). Figure 1.1
highlights our model. Relationships are made as a side-effect of execution of the micro-
service, leading to changes on the micro-service’s subject-domain. Capabilities are security
policies on these changes. If there exists a transition from a trusted subject-domain to one
containing subjects that violate a policy or information flow, then the transition should
not be allowed. For fine-grained attacks, we want to identify the memory regions that
can impact Sg, identify the instructions that should modify those regions, and then enforce
memory access capabilities guaranteeing those are the only instructions modifying those
regions.
To enforce security in cloud computing environments, we must consider stateful subjects
within the hardware (cache lines), add additional trust to relationship monitoring, and fi-
nally, explore tracking of memory that impacts the micro-service’s relationship with subjects
in the system. Having formally added stateful hardware and the relationship with it to our
security model, we can look at mechanisms within the operating system to add capabilities
to the relationship between micro-services and shared caches. The system call boundary is
the primary means a service has for relationships creation between subjects, and is a logical
monitoring point from within a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). Finally, the arguments
to these system calls are dependent on the capability of individual memory modification
instructions to modify memory being passed into system calls that impact a given service’s
security domain, and are the target of modern fine-grained attacks [25, 26]. Building capa-
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bilities lists at the instruction granularity can address these attacks.





𝑔(𝑥, 𝑦) Internal Memory
𝑅2 𝑅3 𝑅𝑛
Figure 1.1: A Function Model of Take-Grant: Micro-Service g(x, y) changing its subject
domain Sg as a side effect of execution through relationships R1 −Rn. Some relationships
are functions of internal state that is modified by fine-grained “subjects” (instructions)
within the service.
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Chapter 2: Capabilities to Access Stateful Hardware
Cache-based side-channel attacks (e.g., [27–29]) are a threat to computing environments
where a diverse set of users share hardware resources and are a leading example of how state-
ful hardware can be leveraged for passive information flow. Such attacks take advantage of
observable hardware side-effects due to the execution of software programs. A number of
these attacks focus on differences in timing while accessing shared processor caches. Re-
cently, researchers have adapted these cache-based side-channel attacks to cloud computing
environments, especially IaaS clouds [30–33], and showed that secrets and sensitive infor-
mation can be extracted across co-located VMs. Container frameworks such as Docker [34]
are even more susceptible to such attacks since they share the underlying operating system
kernel [35].
Initial cache-based side-channel attacks focused on gaming schedulers at the OS and VMM
layers [28, 29, 31]. Such approaches focused on resource sharing of L1 and L2 caches within
a single processor core via Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) [27]. Multicore processors
introduce cache-based side-channels via the Last-Level-Cache (LLC), thus making defenses
much harder [33,35].
Many defenses against cache-side-channel attacks in cloud environments have been pro-
posed [36–50]. Existing solutions are insufficient in the following ways. Shannon’s noisy-
channel coding theorem states that information can be transmitted regardless of the amount
of noise on the channel [51]. While probabilistic defenses (e.g., [36–38]) may decrease the
bit-rate of attacks, they cannot fully eliminate them. Defenses that eliminate such attacks,
rather than frustrate techniques employed by the attacker, are more desirable. SMT must
be disabled for some solutions [38], impacting performance and utilization. In addition to a
guaranteed defense, the solution must not severely impact (i) the performance of the appli-
cations or (ii) utilization of the machine. Defenses must minimize the performance impact
of enforcing hard isolation to remain practical. Disabling hyperthreading (e.g., SMT) can
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have a significant impact on machine utilization. To the best of our knowledge, every cloud
provider enables hyperthreading. Costly application rewrites may be required for other
defenses [39–41].
Solutions must be easy to adopt. History has shown that solutions requiring additional de-
velopment time (or significant changes to existing applications) are less likely to be adopted
(as shown in the Return Oriented Programming (ROP) community [52]). Thus, solutions
that require developers make application level changes [40, 41] may be challenging to apply
to existing workloads. Hardware based approaches are plagued by similar problems – they
are difficult to deploy as they require vendor support and fabrication of new chips [42, 43].
Violating x86 semantics by modifying the resolution, accuracy, or availability of timing in-
structions can frustrate attacks, but consequently require changes to all applications running
on the machine [44–46]. Global compiler and page-coloring cache-partitioning [47–50, 53]
transformations introduce high overhead. JIT techniques allow for local optimization, but
performance remains problematic [54].
In this chapter, we present a hardware-software framework to add capabilities for cache-
access, mitigating side-channel attacks in cloud computing systems that use multicore pro-
cessors with a shared LLC. The proposed framework uses a combination of Commodity-
off-the-Shelf (COTS) hardware features along with novel scheduling techniques to enforce a
cache-access capability, defending against cache-based side-channel attacks. In particular,
we use Cache Allocation Technology (CAT) [55] which allows us to partition last-level caches
at runtime. CAT, coupled with state cleansing during capability transfer between security
domains and selective sharing of common libraries removes the source cache-timing-based
side-channel attacks between different domains. We implement a novel scheduling method
as an extension to the commonly-used Completely-Fair-Scheduler (CFS) in Linux to reduce
the overheads inherent due to any such cleansing operation and to enforce our cache-access
capability by limiting execution to only those processes holding the capability to access the
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a given region. Our solution provides a transparent1 way to eliminate cache-side-channel
attacks while still working with hyperthreading enabled (SMT) systems. It works with con-
tainers, kernel-based virtual machines (vCPUs), and any other schedulable entity that relies
on the OS scheduler2. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to provide trans-
parent protection of applications without disabling hyperthreading.
In summary, we make the following combined contributions via a capability based ap-
proach that:
C1 Can eliminate cache-based side-channel attacks for schedulable units
C2 Allows providers to exploit hyperthreading,
C3 Requires no application level changes, and
C4 Imposes modest performance overheads
2.1 CACHE CAPABILITIES
Consider groups of processes belonging to a given security domain. These processes may
be threads in the same micro-service or many distinct micro-services being run by the same
parent entity or security domain. Each process has a capability list of resources it can access.
These terms are outlined in Table 2.1. Operating systems today have the ability to grant
individual schedulable entities the capability to access a given memory region mr through
the virtual memory subsystem. Operating system schedulers also have the ability to grant
a process the capability to access a limited set of CPU resources rc. We want to extend this
notion of capability to access a given hardware resource to include cache regions, cl.
1From the perspective of the application developer/user.
2For ease of exposition, in the rest of the chapter, we will describe our framework using containers.
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Table 2.1: Cache Capability Definitions
Definition of Term
CP Set of Capabilities for process P
P Set of processes in an isolated region
PA Set of processes in security domain A
mr Memory Resource Capability for memory r
rc CPU Resource Capability for CPU c
cl Capability to access cache region l
D Set containing all security domains running on the system
Let P = PA ∩ PB, the union of processes from two security domains. Note that in
Table 2.1, we introduce the notion of an “isolated region”. This is necessary for cache-access
capability enforcement and is expounded upon in Section 2.4. Consider subject (process)
α ∈ PA and process β ∈ PB. Traditional capability mechanisms available in operating
systems allow for the creation of capability lists of the form: Cα = {mα, rα} and Cβ =
{mβ, rβ}. In this chapter, we extend these capability lists to include the capability to
access a given cache region, cl, that can only be held by a single security domain at a
time. The final capability list for a process β could then become: Cβ = {mβ, rβ, cl}. For
capability enforcement, we want to ensure that if a process within a security domain holds
the capability to access a given cache region, then no other process in any other security
domain can hold the same capability. Formally, ∀ λ ∈ PΛ; ∀ s ∈ D − Λ, ∀ δ ∈ Ps
then cl /∈ Cλ ∩ Cδ. The mechanisms presented in this chapter enforce this invariant
while allowing for capability transfer between security domains to ensure the machine can
still be shared between domains while balancing the performance impact. We use the word
“transfer” to mean revocation by the operating system followed by a subsequent grant of
the cache-access capability to another domain.
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The capability approach presented here is the only defense that can defend against Prime&Probe
cache-based side channel attacks without modifications to the tenant application while also
enabling hyperthreading for the machine at hand. Every cloud provider today leaves hyper-
threading enabled to drive up machine utilization. We evaluate multiple workloads under
varying conditions to explore viability of a strict cache-access capability enforcement mech-
anism. Our changes are implemented on top of the Linux kernel.
2.2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we highlight existing attack mechanisms and defenses. We then review the
cloud systems we target due to current deployment trends. Finally, we provide background
on the scheduling mechanisms we extend for cache-capability enforcement.
2.2.1 Cache Side Channels
Cache side channel attacks take advantage of the shared nature of processor resources, in
particular the processor L1, L2, and Last-Level-Cache (LLC). Prime&Probe attacks were
first explored across VMs by Osvik et al. [27] and shown to be practical in cross-core attacks
via the LLC by Liu et al. [33]. Modern clouds are driving up machine utilization by offering
container based platforms. This both drives revenue [5] while providing more performance
to tenants [56, 57]. Cache side channel attacks are already emerging on container based
infrastructure [35]. Flush+Reload attacks [32] are a real threat to cloud computing security
and have been successfully deployed on public infrastructure [35]. We outline the attack
types in Table 2.2. All of the attacks fall under the broader class of access based side-
channels in which an attacker can tell whether or not a given resource has been accessed by
a victim in a given time period.
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Table 2.2: Cache Based Side Channel Attacks
Cache Level Attack Type Placement
L1 & L2 Prime&Probe Single Physical Core
L1 & L2 Flush+Reload Single Physical Core
L1 & L2 Prime&Probe Single Physical Core, SMT
L1 & L2 Flush+Reload Single Physical Core, SMT
L3/LLC Prime&Probe Cross-Core
L3/LLC Flush+Reload Cross-Core
Prime&Probe Attacks: Originally designed in [27], Prime&Probe attacks derive their
namesake from a two phase approach of priming a cache line and then probing it after a
short period of time. The attack begins with the attacker priming a cache line and then
measuring the time to access the same line to establish a base line for the probe phase. The
attacker will then probe the same cache line and measure the access time. If the access time
is higher than the established base line, then it means that a victim process also accessed
the cache line causing the attacker’s data to be evicted. This probe phase also acts as a
subsequent prime. This measurement loop is repeated until the attacker has sufficient data
on the cache access patterns of a victim process. It is important to note that this technique
is highly dependent on victim code base and requires a cache access pattern be established
for the software package being run by a targeted victim. Methods such as Cache Template
Attacks [58] can be used to generated these patterns. This attack has been demonstrated
on L1 and L2 on a single physical core via hyperthreading [27]. Neve et al. show a very
similar attack that can be carried out on a single core without relying on hyperthreading
by taking advantage of the operating system scheduler [28]. Ristenpart et al. demonstrate
that a variant of Prime&Probe can be used to determine cache usage on a host VMM [30]
while Zhang et al. demonstrated that the Prime&Probe method could be used to extract
private keys across VMs [31]. It is important to note that the authors had to add extra
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layers of processing to reduce the additional noise and scheduling impacts of the VMM.
When working with containers, these complications are eliminated, making the attack easier
to carry out. It was initially thought that simply scheduling processes on different cores
might eliminate the security risk because it would be too difficult to carry out the attack on
the LLC. Liu et al. were the first to show that the technique could be successfully executed
on the LLC [33]; their work was carried out in a VM environment. Again with this attack, it
will be easier to carry out in container environments as the noise and overheads associated
with the VMM are removed.
Flush+Reload Attacks: Flush+Reload attacks rely on shared memory between two
executing processes and were first used in [29] to derive an AES key from a victim pro-
cess, though not under the Flush+Reload name. The attack utilizes similar probing to the
Prime&Probe attack to determine if a given cache line was accessed with the requirement
that memory must be shared between the attacker and victim. The nature of shared memory
allows an attacker to determine which branch within a shared library was taken by a victim
process. Gullasch et al. show that clflush can be used on x86 platforms to flush cache lines
of libraries shared between processes on the same host on a single core [29] and then probes
can be used to produce an access based side-channel. While they do not show the attack
with hyperthreads, the single physical core case will be very similar. Flush+Reload works
by first flushing a piece of memory using clflush and then measuring the time to reload
the flushed memory location. If the reload phase takes the same amount of time as a previ-
ously established baseline measurement, then the victim process accessed the same piece of
memory. The Flush+Reload term was first used by Yarom et al. to attack RSA when the
authors extended the technique to multi-core, leveraging the LLC. The authors tuned the
attack to work with multiple VMs [59] sharing pages due to memory de-duplication processes
running within the VMMs. Shortly afterwards, Irazoqui et al. use Flush+Reload to success-
fully attack AES in a cross-VM scenario with the attack completing in under a minute [32].
Yarom et al. has also used Flush+Reload to attack the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
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Algorithm in OpenSSL on a single quad-core host [60]. This more closely represents the
container-like deployment in which processes all run on the same host kernel. With the rise
of containers and interest in PaaS clouds, focus has shifted to practical deployments of the
attack. Zhang et al. showed a Flush+Reload attack deployed on the public PaaS DotCloud
which uses container technology as the underlying deployment mechanism [35]. In container
deployments, shared memory stems from the fact that image base layers are shared and are
loaded from the same location on disk implying that they use the same page-cache. This is
similar to the way shared libraries work in a traditional computing environment.
2.2.2 Existing Solutions
Some solutions are probabilistic [36–38] which is insufficient as they cannot fully eliminate
the source of cache-based side-channel attacks. Existing approaches achieve single core iso-
lation by disabling hyperthreading [38]. Disabling hyperthreading reduces the throughput
of not only tenants requiring extra isolation, but the entire machine. Such approaches are
untenable as the economic model behind cloud computing dictates high per machine utiliza-
tion [5]. Cutting whole-machine utilization by even 20%, the impact of hyperthreading in
2005 [61], is too high for cloud computing. We argue that while for some tenants, a 20%
overhead may be a reasonable trade-off for increased security, there is little value in forcing
all tenants to pay that performance penalty. StealthMem is able to enable hyperthreading,
but the authors do not sufficiently address cross thread scheduling issues [40] and require
application developers to make code changes. CATalyst [41] follows a similar defense model
to StealthMem but uses Intel’s CAT technology to assign virtual pages to sensitive vari-
ables instead of software-based page coloring. Application rewrites are necessary for these
approaches [39–41], increasing the cost of adoption. Costly hardware changes [42, 43] face
similar adoption challenges. CHERI [53] takes a similar capability based approach to cache-
access, but at this time is not available to cloud providers in COTS systems as it requires
custom hardware. Some hardware approaches change timing instruction behavior which
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changes the semantics of the architecture [44–46], again forcing application changes. Cache
coloring [47–49] approaches have impractically high overheads.
CACHEBAR [38] defends against Flush+Reload attacks by duplicating memory pages on
access from separate processes, a scheme it calls Copy-On-Read. Since Kernel-Same-Page-
Merging (KSM) does de-duplication of pages at regular intervals, it also modifies the behavior
of KSM to achieve Copy-On-Read. To defend against Prime&Probe attacks, CACHEBAR
modifies the memory allocation based on which memory regions are cacheable so that the
attacking process loses visibility into the victim process. This technique provides only prob-
abilistic guarantees for defense against a Prime&Probe attack while also disabling hyper-
threading. Other solutions that rely on the scheduler [62] focus on uniprocessor systems,
thus do not have to face the challenges faced by caches shared by multiple cores. The solution
presented by Godrey et al. [63] suggests scheduling patterns for VMs can decrease the cost
of cache-flushing. Their solution only works in hypervisors. Our work is more generic in that
it applies to any schedulable entity, be it a container or a vCPU supporting a KVM VM.
Other ideas in [63] are similar: they use cache coloring techniques while we use hardware
cache partitioning, but they rely on infrequent context switches between vCPUs and do not
content with the need for a form of “strict” co-scheduling.
Finally, solutions like Nomad [37], while probabilistic, complement our approach. Nomad
works in the cloud scheduler to reduce the co-residency of different security domains. Our so-
lution could be used in conjunction with Nomad to provide hard isolation when co-residency
is not possible.
2.2.3 Intel’s Cache Allocation Technology
We utilize Intel’s CAT to isolate a portion of the cache as a “secure partition” so that a
capability to access this isolated region can be produced. CAT allows a processor’s LLC to
be partitioned into 4 segments on our test machine (this number will likely increase in future
generations). The partitions are configured using a bitmask that is written into an Model
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Specific Register (MSR) on Intel’s Broadwell and later CPUs. CAT provides isolation for
a given cache by not-allowing evictions on that partition from cores belonging to another
partition. It is important to note that cross-partition cache hits are still allowed even with
CAT enabled. A configured cache partition can be used by a select number of cores. Each
core has a core specific MSR dictating which “class-of-service” (the Intel nomenclature for
cache partitions) it is running in. When discussing an isolated region, we are referring to
both the cache partition and the set of CPUs assigned to that cache partition. The size of
the cache partition can be reduced to limit the cost of flushing the cache during capability
transfer. The reduced cache size has little impact on cloud based workloads [64]. Using this
feature alone as a defense would dictate that the capability to access a secure partition be
limited to a single core so that cross-thread, cross-domain Prime&Probe attacks would be
prevented, but would not prevent Flush+Reload attacks.
2.2.4 Platform-as-a-Service
Containers have been popularized by Docker [65] and have better performance when com-
pared to VMs [56, 57]. Containers are the main building block for PaaS as they allow for
fast, repeatable, and scalable deployments of the web-serving workloads that PaaS target.
Ristenpart et al. show that it is possible to maliciously collocate tenant workloads on VM
based cloud infrastructure [30]. Ristenpart’s collocation approach has been extended for
container based infrastructure in [35] for usage in deploying a side channel attack on Dot-
Cloud, a popular PaaS. Containers run as isolated processes running on top of the same
kernel, allowing for many more tenants per provider-machine. Original cache based side
channel attacks [27, 66] focused on the cross-process single-kernel environment - containers
exhibit the same properties. Single kernel side-channels attacks are well understood, thus
the risk to container based deployment is higher than for VMs. Existing VM based defenses
do not have to deal with the scale of the per-process isolation required to defend against
side-channel attacks in PaaS.
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2.2.5 Scheduling
Because of the popularity of Docker [65] on Linux, we limit our discussion to Linux. Our
capability approach remains generic. Scheduling in Linux is motivated by Weighted-Fair-
Queuing (WFQ) [67] originally developed for improving the Quality of Service of packet
networks. Early attempts at scheduling in Linux focused on reducing the algorithmic com-
plexity of the scheduler’s decision making process. This lead to the so-called O(1) scheduler,
the namesake of which is also the algorithmic complexity of the algorithm. The O(1) sched-
uler performed poorly on I/O bound workloads on desktop systems as any latency sensitive
workload, like those suitable for scale-out cloud deployment, had to wait for proceeding
processes to exhaust their time-slice. To improve responsiveness, the community moved to
the WFQ-motivated CFS algorithm. This brought with it the introduction of per-thread
vruntime’s which track per-thread weighted time on the processor. Over a given stable
“epoch”, a time frame for which no threads are entering or leaving the system, CFS can
guarantee fairness and ensure that I/O bound processes are not starved. In our implemen-
tation, we leverage a co-scheduling algorithm to ensure proper capability transfer between
domains. The algorithm is implemented within the Linux CFS scheduler, but only operates
on cores which have been designated as being isolated. A detailed explanation of how this
is done in Section 2.4. For a complete discussion on scheduling in Linux, we refer the reader
to Love’s book [68].
2.3 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we outline the hardware requirements of our systems. We describe our
specific machine used for testing and evaluation. Finally, we introduce the threat model
which drives the design decisions behind cache-access capabilities.
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2.3.1 Cloud Environments and Commodity Hardware
We assume cloud workloads like those presented in [64] are being run. We consider public
Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) or Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud environments. Such
environments allow for co-residency of multiple computational appliances such as containers
or VMs belonging to potentially different security domains. We assume that the cloud
computing infrastructure is built using commodity-off-the-shelf (COTS) components. In
particular, we assume that the servers have multi-core processors with multiple levels of
caches, some of which are shared. We also assume that the servers have a runtime mechanism
to partition the last-level shared cache as described in Section 2.2.3.
In this chapter, we use an Intel Haswell series processor that has a three-level cache
hierarchy: private level 1 (L1) and level 2 (L2) caches for each core (64KB and 256KB
respectively) and a last level (L3) cache (20MB) that is shared among all the cores. For
cache partitioning, we turned to Intel’s Cache Allocation Technology (CAT) [55] that allows
us to partition the shared L3 cache. The CAT mechanism is configured using MSRs. This can
be achieved at runtime dynamically using software mechanisms. On this specific processor
model the maximum number of partitions is limited to four but newer generations support
more [69]. Intel CAT technology has been available on select Haswell series processors since
late 2014 and continues to be available on select processor lines belonging to the Broadwell
and Skylake micro-architectures that succeeded the Haswell micro-architecture.
While our implementation and evaluation uses an Intel Haswell processor with Intel CAT
technology, the proposed approach is generally applicable to any multi-core processor with a




We assume that the attacker can easily collocate a container next to a victim workload as
shown in literature [30, 35] with the goal of carrying out a cache-based side-channel attack.
We assume that container base layers are shared across tenants by default, introducing
the risk of Flush+Reload attacks. The attacker can sleep, allocate memory using memory
allocation system calls and otherwise try to game the scheduler or memory allocation policies.
We consider both cross-core (i.e., attacker and victim running on different cores on the
same processor) and same-core (i.e., attacker and victim running on the same core) side-
channel attacks. Same-core attacks, as the name indicates, require the attacker achieve
co-residency on the same core and be able to preempt the victim. They typically focus
on higher-level caches (L1 and L2) that are specific to the core. Cross-core attacks on the
other hand only require the attacker achieve co-residency on the same physical server. If
multi-socket systems are used, we assume the attacker can achieve co-residency on the same
socket as the victim. Their limitation is that they only allow the attacker to observe the
victim’s activities through the LLC which is shared by all cores on the chip and thus is noisy.
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, it has been shown that such limitations can be overcome [33].
We assume the attacker is capable of achieving co-residency with a victim, can allocate
an arbitrary number of resources, and game both the cloud level scheduler (placement) and
the operating system level scheduler (preemption). However, we assume that the cloud
infrastructure provider is trusted. That is, while the cloud scheduler may be gamed, we
assume that both the attacker and victim are authenticated with the cloud provider (e.g.,
for billing purposes). Additionally, we assume that the host kernel, running either KVM or
container frameworks, is trusted.
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2.4 DESIGN OF CAPABILITY ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
Our solution contains cross domain contamination through strict cache-access capability
enforcement. We implemented cache-access capabilities via software based flushing, hard-
ware based cache isolation, and per-domain duplication of container base layers. Flushing
costs are reduced through the novel use of hardware cache size reduction and software based
temporal partitioning through the use of a co-scheduling capability enforcement algorithm.
The solution allows schedulable entities to be grouped into security domains and ensures
there is no leakage across domains. Unlike existing approaches, we can enable hyperthread-
ing while also being completely transparent to guest applications. There is no need to
manually rebuild an application to indicate the parts most vulnerable to side channels as
was done in [41]. Additionally, there is no implied performance impact to tenants with less
strict security requirements outside of a reduced cache size.
Our Flush+Reload defense has little impact on CPU utilization, but will increase disk and
memory usage. Existing approaches for Flush+Reload such as the one produced by Zhou
et al. [38] rely on dynamic memory duplication. This not only drives up memory usage, but
may impact the performance of micro-services by making the shared memory portion of the
kernel more complex.
Intuitively, flushing the cache during a context switch between entities belonging to dif-
ferent security domains defends against any attack that uses cache based timing to derive
information from L1 and L2 caches. Flushing alone will not defend against LLC attacks as
the LLC is shared across cores, thus per-core cache partitions must be created. “Secure”
workloads then must be limited to a single core on either a software based partition (cache-
coloring) [40, 49] or hardware based cache partitioning, which until recently has not been
available on COTS hardware.
Our framework logically partitions a host server into an isolated region3 and a shared region
as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Tenants are required to indicate to the cloud provider whether or












Figure 2.1: Defense Architecture
not their containers need isolated execution. Entities that require isolated execution will be
executed while their parent domain holds the capability to access a separate cache partition
on the host server; all other entities will be executed with a shared cache partition. The
“isolated execution” designation guarantees that processes within the designated containers
will not share cache resources with (i) processes from any container belonging to another
security domain or with (ii) processes belonging to any container that is not designated
for isolated execution irrespective of their security domain. Consider the cloud deployment
of a web service using a micro-service based architecture. We envision a system in which
the tenant indicates that the load-balancer (usually an HTTP reverse proxy) should run in
the isolated region. The load-balancer is the micro-service often responsible for encrypting
connections and thus may contain sensitive functions and data which could be the target of
a cache-based side-channel attack.
Our design leverages (i) Intel CAT, processor affinities, and selective page sharing to
provide spatial isolation and (ii) co-scheduling with state cleansing to provide temporal
isolation for designated containers, granting the capability to access the isolated cache region
to a single security domain at a time.
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2.4.1 Hardware-Assisted Capability Enforcement for Spatial Isolation
Intel’s CAT [55], currently available in COTS hardware in Intel’s Xeon series processors,
is designed to improve the performance of latency sensitive workloads by allowing the LLC
to be partitioned into distinct regions. Each processor core is thus restricted to allocating
cache lines into a specified cache partition. Consequently, a processor can only evict cache
lines within its own assigned LLC partition, thus reducing the impact of processes running
on other cache regions and vice versa. In particular, note that the ability to allocate cache
lines, priming in Prime&Probe attacks, in a cache shared with the victim and the ability
to evict cache lines being used by the victim process, flushing in Flush+Reload attacks,
are key steps in cache-based side-channel attacks. Ensuring potential victim and attacker
processes run on cores associated with different LLC cache partitions defeats many cache-
side-channel attacks. Specifically, cross-core Prime&Probe attacks on a victim process are
eliminated between the isolated and shared regions since we use different cache partitions.
An additional source of side-channels, shared memory, is discussed in Section 2.4.2.
Cores in the system are associated with partitions such that each core is assigned to
one and only one LLC partition. We refer to these partition-core combinations as isolated
and shared regions. The maximum number of cache partitions available with Intel CAT is
fixed for a given micro-architecture. The machine used for our testing allows for up to 4
distinct partitions, but newer machines have 16. The configuration of size, number of active
partitions, and core to partition assignment occurs in software and can be adjusted based
on the demand for isolated execution and the needs of the expected workloads. If there
is no demand for shared execution then the host server could be partitioned into two (or
more) isolated partitions. In this chapter, we evaluate a single isolated region and a single
shared region, though the technique works equally well with multiple isolated regions. The
cache-access capability is a capability granted to a domain to access a single isolated region.
As previously discussed, hardware-assisted spatial partitioning protects the containers
running in the isolated partition against cross-core Prime&Probe style attacks from contain-
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ers running in the shared partition. However, cross-core side-channel attacks across cache
partitions are not entirely eliminated. Intel CAT, primarily designed to improve fairness
of cache sharing and performance of latency sensitive workloads, allows cache hits across
partition boundaries to maximize the benefits of shared memory such as the libc shared
library. In particular, if the victim and the attacker processes share memory, because of
layered file systems used in container frameworks for example, an attacker can carry out
a Flush+Reload attack. Since the attacker previously flushed the cache lines, a cache hit
indicates that the victim executing in a different core (and LLC partition) has used or is
using the library. While CAT limits the granularity of information an attacker can glean
across partition boundaries, timing observations are still possible and hence the side-channel
is not entirely eliminated while using CAT. Furthermore, attacks within an isolated partition
continue to be viable. These will be addressed in the following sections.
The partial protection against cache-side-channel attacks obtained through spatial parti-
tioning comes at the cost of reduced LLC cache size and the associated potential reduction
in performance. Fortunately, reduction in cache size has been shown to have relatively little
impact on modern cloud workloads [64]. In particular, minimal performance sensitivity to
LLC size has been reported for cache sizes above 4− 6MB with modern scale-out and server
workloads (see Section 4.3 and Figure 4 in [64]) that are typical in cloud environments.
2.4.2 Selective Page Sharing
To ensure the cache-access capability is enforced properly, we must identify all sources of
cross-domain cache-access to enforce the invariant described in Section 2.1. As previously
discussed, hardware-assisted spatial partitioning does not eliminate cross-core Flush+Reload
style attacks when the attacker and the victim share memory pages. Modern container
deployments have one primary source of shared memory, causing cache-lines to be shared
across domains. We limit our discussion to Docker as it is one of the most popular choices
for building container images and running them on Linux platforms, but these concepts also
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extend to other container frameworks. Docker uses storage drivers that are built on top of
Union File Systems (UFS) so that a process inside of a container can access a file system
composed of a stack of layers. Several different containers may use the same versions of
libraries and other base components, thus a way was needed to reduce disk and memory
usage of the common building blocks. Docker addressed the need to share base components
by uniquely identifying each layer by its cryptographic hash and sharing common layers
between all containers built using a given layer ID.
Often there are multiple containers running the same image which causes them to share
every layer except for the upper-most writable layer. For example, two Apache Tomcat
servers running on the same Docker host using the same image would share all binaries
including the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), Apache Tomcat, GnuPG, and OpenSSL among
others. Only the top most layer, containing writable elements such as the Tomcat log file,
differ between containers.
To enforce the cache-access capability in container deployments, we eliminate cross-domain
page sharing through selective layer duplication. That is, for containers requiring isolated
execution, our system allows sharing of layers only among containers belonging to the same
security domain but not otherwise. This is a reasonable trade-off as it enables isolation
between different tenants while limiting the increase in memory usage. In particular, the
increase in memory usage will be a function of the number of tenants running on the server
rather than the number of containers. We do not prevent traditional sharing of layers for
containers running in a shared partition.
For VMs, the kernel same-page merging (KSM) module in Linux, used for memory de-
duplication, is the main source of shared pages. However, KSM and memory de-duplication
in general come with their own security risks (e.g., [70–73]). For instance it has been shown
that KSM can be leveraged to break ASLR [70], enable Rowhammer [74] attacks across
VMs [72], and create a timing side-channel that can be used to detect the existence of
software across VMs [73], much like the Flush+Reload style attack discussed previously.
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Given the serious security concerns surrounding the use of KSM, we leave it disabled. Same
page merging is disabled by default on commercial products from VMWare as well [75].
Note that selective page sharing, combined with hardware-assisted spatial partitioning,
eliminates cross-core cache-side-channel attacks across partitions by allowing cache-access
capabilities enforcement at the cache-partition boundary. Selective page sharing removes
the ability for an attacker to measure interference after flushing a given address and CAT
partitioning removes the ability for an attacker to prime a victim’s cache across partition
boundaries. Cache-side-channel attacks from within an isolated partition due to multi-core
and SMT continue to be a threat and will be discussed next. A way is needed to transfer the
capability to access a given cache-partition to another security domain to allow an isolated
region to be shared without leaking information.
2.4.3 State Cleansing During Capability Transfer
Even with containers running in isolated partitions, an attacker allocated to the same
isolated partition as the victim might be able to (i) observe the victim’s LLC usage if
scheduled to run on a different core than the victim but associated with the same partition
and (ii) even observe the victim’s L1 and L2 usage if running on the same physical core
as the victim [31]. In the latter case an attacker observes the cache usage of the victim by
managing to frequently alternate execution with the victim process, or via SMT.
To thwart these attacks we propose to cleanse the cache state when transferring the cache-
access capability between schedulable entities belonging to different security domains. That
is, if a process from one security domain, SD1, runs on a core, then processes belonging to
another domain, SD2, must either run on a core assigned to a separate partition or state-
cleansing of the shared caches must be performed on the partition during the transfer of the
cache-access capability from SD1 from SD2. There currently exists no hardware instruction
for per-partition cache invalidation. More detail on how state cleansing can be achieved is
in Section 2.5. However, state cleansing alone does not prevent attacks from an attacker
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process that is running in parallel with the victim either on the same-core through SMT, or
running on a different core but in the same partition.
A na¨ıve solution for capability transfer within a single isolated region would be to assign
a single core to the isolated partition, disable hyper-threading and perform state-cleansing
on every context-switch. The performance cost of such an approach is unattractive. A
mitigation would be to create multiple isolated partitions with a single-core assigned to
each one. However, the number of cache partitions is finite, 4 in our case, and such an
approach would further fragment the LLC and hamper performance for the shared partition.
Furthermore, many cloud workloads are multi-threaded and leverage additional cores when
available. Thus, a mechanism is needed to enforce cache-access capabilities while assigning
multiple logical-cores to an isolated region allowing for more scalability within an isolated
region.
2.4.4 Co-scheduling for Temporal Isolation
To address the aforementioned threat, we use a novel scheduling technique for temporal
separation of security domains. Co-scheduling container processes belonging to a given secu-
rity domain across multiple processors amortizes the cost of state cleansing during capability
transfer, but introduces additional complexity as discussed below.
Scale-out workloads with many threads, those commonly deployed on cloud infrastructure,
motivate this approach. As thread counts for a security domain increase, the number of
threads able to run per domain at any given time will be high. This allows us to drive up
utilization of cores assigned to a partition and only flush the partition when transferring
the cache-access capability to the next domain. The complexities stem from needing to
synchronize all isolated cores during capability transfer, thus any implementation of co-
scheduling has to guarantee an exclusion property. No task belonging to security domain
SDX can run on an isolated processor while a task from another domain, SDY , is running in
a processor associated with the same isolated partition to enforce the invariant in Section 2.1.
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Additionally, before SDX can be granted the cache-access capability, a state cleansing event
must occur. As shown in Figure 2.2, multiple cores can be utilized at once within a security
domain. However, state-cleansing must be performed as every core assigned to a given
partition context switches to the security domain for which the cache-access capability has
been transferred. The next security domain cannot run on any isolated processor until this
process is complete.
Isolated
Core 0 Core 1 Core 3Core 2 Core 7 Core 8 Core 9
SD0 SD0 SD0 SD0






= Schedulable UnitSD = Security Domain
Figure 2.2: Co-scheduling Overview - The isolated environment is on the left. It consists of
an isolated cache partition along with the processors assigned to that partition.
Co-scheduling is used to group tasks belonging to the same security domain and state
cleansing events occur when changing domains. Regular tasks are on the right in a
separate cache partition. Tasks on the right, those in the shared region, have no scheduling
restrictions.
2.5 IMPLEMENTATION
Partitioning the LLC and associating cores with each partition does not require changes
to the kernel or the operating system. It can be done by a system administrator as part of
the machine configuration. Here we focus on the implementation of our co-scheduling and
selective-sharing mechanisms.
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Figure 2.3: Limitations of Default Scheduling Policy
Default Scheduler: Consider containers from two security domains or organizations
with thread configurations as shown in Table 2.3 running on two cores. Simply executing on
the cores requires allowing the processes to access the L1, and L2 caches belonging to those
cores along with the entire LLC. The defining characteristic in our example is the shared
cache. For hyperthreaded cores, this is the L1, L2 and LLC. In the case of two physical
cores, the shared cache is only the LLC. The cores 1 and 2 in Figure 2.3 are not cores on
two separate sockets on the same motherboard. Figure 2.3 shows an example schedule that
might result from the default scheduler in Linux.
Table 2.3: Per-Domain Thread Allocations
Domain ID Thread Count
ORG1 2
ORG2 3
Even if the scheduler flushes between scheduling different containers, the other organiza-
tion has the ability to carry out a cache-base side-channel attack. This process is shown
in Figure 2.4. Consider the flushing events f1 on Core1 and f2 and f3 on Core2 as shown
in Figure 2.4. Despite the flushing event f1, attacks can be carried out across containers
belonging to different domains during ∆t1. This limitation is repeated at flushing event f3
for a period of ∆t2. It is clear that enabling hyperthreading or assigning multiple cores
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Figure 2.4: Limitations of Default Scheduling Policy + Flushing
Traditional CFS in Linux was born out of the need to reduce the impact to latency sensi-
tive jobs. We introduce a Strict-Co-Scheduling (SCS) algorithm for cache-access capability
enforcement. Our SCS implementation aims to reduce the cost of transferring the capability
to access a given cache region due to flushing while remaining favorable to latency sensitive
tasks by utilizing CFS within a security domain.
The terms outlined in Table 2.4 are used to describe the SCS algorithm we introduce.
Like the default Linux scheduler, if no work is available the processor will idle. There are
two main changes to the default scheduler class that are not shown here. When choosing
a process to run, the scheduler will always choose from PPrivilegedDomain. Additionally, the
default scheduler will not schedule a process for less than MinRuntime. To ensure our SCS
algorithm remains as work-conserving as possible, a thread may be preempted after only
running for a fraction of the MinRuntime where necessary. More discussion on this below.
Algorithm 2.1 highlights how the SCS nextDomain function is implemented in Linux.
Once the next next domain is chosen, cores schedule threads only from PPrivilegedDomain or
idle until work is available. This approach introduces little additional algorithm complexity.
Because the O(1) scheduler in Linux, which is round-robin, performs worse for latency
sensitive tasks, we would expect this to remain the case when using round-robin as a basis
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for SCS. We mitigate this impact by only transferring the cache-access capability in a round
robin fashion, while utilizing the CFS scheduler when scheduling processes from the domain
holding the cache-access capability.
Table 2.4: Terms used in Scheduling Algorithm
Definition of Term
SDCList A circularly linked list of security domains.
i The index offset in to SDCList.
P The queue of runnable processes in the system sorted
from least to greatest vruntime
PDOMAIN The queue of runnable processes belonging to
DOMAIN sorted from least to greatest vruntime.
PrivilegedDomain The security domain currently holding the cache-
access capability.
MinRuntime The minimum runtime for which a thread should be
scheduled.
Algorithm 2.1 Strict-Co-Scheduling (SCS) Domain Selection
function nextDomain
i← i+ 1
i← i mod SDCList.size()
domain← SDCList[i]
while size(P ) > 0 AND size(Pdomain) == 0 do
i← i+ 1





The downside with SCS stems from the system’s inability to remain work-conserving
under certain situations. In a work-conserving system, the processor never idles if there
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is work that can be done by any process in the system. By very definition, we can not
consider all processes during the isolated run of a single group of tasks belonging to the
same security domain. We highlight three different cases which demonstrate an inability to
remain work-conserving using the configuration as outline by Table 2.3.
Figure 2.5 shows the situation in whichORG1 : THREAD2 finishes before the PrivilegedDomain’s
(ORG1) MinRuntime is up, leading to a ∆u1 underutilized time span The system must
idle until the next capability transfer occurs, assuming work is available for the next do-
main. Once ORG1 is scheduled again, ORG1 : THREAD1 may be waiting on input for
a period of ∆u2. Again, the system will remain underutilized for a period of time and
ORG1 : THREAD1 will not receive the full MinRuntime.
In order to mitigate situations of low utilization such as the one presented in Figure 2.5,
we choose to violate the MinRuntime guarantee provided to processes in Linux. Consider
the situations in which the number of processes for the PrivilegedDomain exceeds the
number of cores, as is the case for ORG2. As shown in Figure 2.6, we can schedule ORG2 :
THREAD3 if ORG2 : THREAD2 does not use its full MinRuntime. This means that
ORG2 : THREAD2 will not be scheduled for the full MinRuntime, potentially introducing
more context switching.
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Figure 2.6: Work Conserving










Figure 2.7: Worst Case Under-Utilization
Figure 2.7 demonstrates a worst case scenario upon granting ORG2 the cache-access
capability. If only one thread can do work, then one core will be underutilized for ∆u4
which will be equal to the full MinRuntime. The performance of interactive workloads
with long inter-arrival times of requests could lead to situations like this. Note that this
is the worst case because if there are no runnable tasks in a domain, we will not grant the
domain the cache-access capability.
The goal of violating the MinRuntime guarantee afforded to processes in Linux is to drive
up utilization. This can lead to unintended consequences depending on workload. Consider
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the case presented in Figure 2.8. Our approach is to revoke ORG1’s cache-access capability
and then grant it to ORG2 if both threads for ORG1 finish before the MinRuntime is
reached. Upon switching to ORG2, consider an example in which work is only available for
a single thread. Partway through the execution of ORG2 : THREAD1 work may become
available for ORG2 : THREAD2, so it is scheduled. This processes might be repeated for
ORG2 : THREAD3, leading to three distinct times of under-utilization, ∆u6, ∆u7, ∆u8,
the sum of which is guaranteed to be strictly less than MinRuntime. This situation should
be rare in practice as long as the mean processing time for I/O bound processes is greater
than the MinRuntime, but can come into play when multiple threads have been scheduled
for many MinRuntime’s and are nearing the end their current workload. If this case were to
occur frequently in practice it may drive up the amount of time spent underutilized and for
which transferring the cache-access capability to another security domain might have been
more appropriate. This can be minimized if the proper number of threads are chosen for
























Figure 2.8: Side-Effects of Work Conserving Properties
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2.5.2 Linux Kernel Modifications
Co-scheduling can enforce proper capability transfer between security domains, but any
implementation must be precise. By precise, we mean that any form of “loose” or “lazy”
co-scheduling is unacceptable. Co-Scheduling attempts in Linux have been focused on VMs.
Existing patches are “best-effort” co-scheduling [76]. These “soft”-co-schedulers try to find
a thread to run that belongs to the same group of processes as the thread just scheduled. If
no thread is found, there is no guarantee that one from another security-domain will not be
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Figure 2.9: Limitations of Best-Effort Co-Scheduling Policy
Figure 2.9 is a schedule instance of the configuration as described in Table 2.3. The
example is a situation in which 2 cores are associated with an isolated partition and are
running containers belonging to two security domains. These cores may be two physical
cores or one physical core presented as two to the operating system as is the case with SMT.
The defining characteristic in our example is the shared cache. For hyperthreaded cores,
this is the L1, L2, and LLC. In the case of two physical cores, the shared cache is only the
LLC. The cores 1 and 2 in our example are cores on the same socket.
Consider a situation in which Core1 initiates capability transfer before scheduling a thread
from a conflicting domain, ORG2:THREAD1 in this example. Even if the scheduler invokes a
flushing event, f1, there remains a ∆t1 during which cross-core, cross-domain attacks could
be carried out. This is seen again after Core1 schedules ORG1:THREAD1 and ORG2:THREAD3
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leading to durations ∆t2 and ∆t3 during which attacks remain feasible. While this situation
is still better than the one presented in Figure 2.3 it highlights the need to pay particular
attention to the implementation subtleties when implementing co-scheduling of processes
in the same security domain on modern operating systems. Effective elimination of side-
channels dictates that cross-core synchronization be performed before state cleansing occurs
and subsequent domain scheduling takes place.
Our SCS algorithm is implemented by modifying the default CFS scheduler in Linux. The
default Linux scheduler performs time accounting on a per group basis through the usage of
layers of red-black trees in place of a traditional run-queue [77]. At the lowest layer, there is
a red-black tree consisting of all the tasks in the system. The cgroup layer is directly above
the layer of task structs. A task group is a Linux kernel data structure used to group
“schedulable entities.” These entities may be other task group’s or individual task struct’s
representing a single thread. One node at this layer would hold all the task structs for a
single container for example. Above that is a layer of parent-cgroups - a layer that only
exists if the user specifically creates a cgroup holding other cgroups. In our system, one such
node is created by the Docker daemon anytime a new parent-cgroup option is used. A node
at this layer contains per-CPU run queues that can be traversed through the child-cgroup
layer to reach all the tasks belonging to a given domain.
The per-CPU data structures associated with nodes at each layer are stored in the
task group struct which also has a siblings field, a linked list pointing to other task group’s
at the same level. We hold a pointer to the head of this list (which is not associated with any
task group) and maintain a separate pointer to the PRIVILEGED DOMAIN. Transferring the
cache-access capability can be performed by simply setting the PRIVILEGED DOMAIN pointer
to the next item in the list that is not the head and pointing to a task group with runnable
tasks. This makes up the nextDomain function as outlined by Algorithm 2.1.
To ensure that no two schedulable units belonging to different security domains run on
an isolated cache partition simultaneously, we implement the core synchronization protocol
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shown in Figure 2.10. The protocol works by making the first core in an isolated parti-
tion a leader core. The leader core is responsible for revoking the cache-access capability,
synchronizing cores, state cleansing via a cache flush, and finally, granting the cache-access
capability to another security domain. All isolated cores only schedule tasks belonging to the
PRIVILEGED DOMAIN, a global variable pointing to the task group for the security domain
holding the cache-access capability. We work at the third level of task group’s such that
all containers belonging to a security domain are contained within the task group pointed
to by PRIVILEGED DOMAIN. Note that while only 2 cores are shown in Figure 2.10, the ap-
proach works with any number of cores. In Section 3.8 we evaluate the protocol with 4 cores
















Figure 2.10: Strict Co-Scheduling Protocol
To allow multiple cores to be assigned to the same cache partition, we use a follow-the-
leader approach to scheduling. A leader core is in charge of initializing capability transfers
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Figure 2.11: Strict Co-Scheduling Example
This algorithm is invoked under two circumstances. The first is the result of a timer that
runs every MinRuntime milliseconds. The timer checks to see if work is available in another
domain and, if so, grants the capability to access this cache region to the next domain
with available work. If no other domain can be run, this process simply reschedules the
timer interrupt. On the other hand, if another domain is to run, the leader invokes a
synchronization routine in which each of the follower cores schedule an idle process and send
an acknowledgment to the leader core. Upon receiving acknowledgments from all follower
cores, the leader will flush the partition and force the follower cores to re-run their scheduler
functions in order to schedule tasks from domain now holding the cache-access capability.
Isolated cores rely on two pieces of shared state to achieve strict synchronization. The
leader core is the only core that can modify state. The ROUND OVER variable indicates to
follower cores that a capability transfer is about to occur. A timer on the leader core initiates
a domain change by modifying this variable and invoking the schedule function on the
leader core. The capability transfer event fires every sysctl sched min granularity, a
configurable parameter exposed to administrators on Linux based systems to control system
responsiveness. This is the variable exposed to allow administrators to control MinRuntime.
After setting the ROUND OVER variable to true, the leader core issues a reschedule command
via an Inter-Processor Interrupt to follower cores and waits for them to send back an ac-
knowledgment. The acknowledgment is performed within the schedule function on fol-
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lower cores. When the ROUND OVER variable is set, partitioned cores can only run trusted
processes. These are only kernel tasks, including: ksoftirq, watchdog, and the idle task.
Ensuring such processes can run prevents deadlocks due to watchdog timeouts.
After receiving an acknowledgment back from all follower cores, indicating they are no
longer running tasks belonging to any security domain, the leader then flushes the cache and
updates the PRIVILEGED DOMAIN to point to the next security domain using Algorithm 2.1.
Our system uses a separate task group within the Linux kernel for each security domain.
Run-queue checking is performed to ensure a domain with runnable tasks is chosen.
Having chosen the next domain, the leader core sets ROUND OVER to false and again
issues a reschedule command to follower cores. The schedule function will eventually be
invoked on the follower cores, but we use the reschedule command to reduce the idle time
of follower cores. This protocol corrects the problem presented in Figure 2.9 resulting in
“strict” co-scheduling as seen in Figure 2.11.
As previously mentioned, to ensure that less idling occurs, we will initiate a capability
transfer if the PRIVILEGED DOMAIN has no more runnable tasks, as shown by the first run of
ORG1 tasks in Figure 2.8. This is accomplished by having a cpu mask, the bits of which
represent which cores in the partition are idling. If a core schedules an idle process, it sets
the corresponding bit to 1. That core then checks to see if all the other cores in the partition
are also idle. If so, it forces the timer described above to run on the leader core. This could
be extended further by making the transfer occur once a certain percentage of cores in the
partition are idle. For now, we focus on the capability-enforcement mechanism and leave
policy optimizations up to future work.
It is clear that this approach will impose overhead due to the synchronization costs between
cores assigned to a given partition. It is important to remember that these costs are only
paid by containers for which increased isolation is required. Regular containers will not pay
additional overheads and can be co-located on the same machines as containers utilizing
the above scheduling policies without incurring any penalty as we show in our evaluation
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section. Despite the overhead, we feel that the trade-off is worth it for critical applications.
2.5.3 State Cleansing
The isolated cache partition must be cleaned or flushed before switching context to a
different security domain. For a processor cache, state cleansing or flushing equates to
invalidating the cache lines or evicting them, but no hardware mechanism exists to flush the
cache lines assigned to a single CAT partition. The WBINVD instruction invalidates the
entire shared cache, disrupting processes in all partitions.
One way to implement state cleansing is for the user process to invoke the CLFLUSH
instruction, which can evict cache lines corresponding to a linear virtual address and can
be invoked from user space. This can be done by the application process before being
switched out as in [78]. However, this requires changes to user applications which is not
desirable. Another possibility is for the kernel to invoke CLFLUSH on the entire virtual
address space. While this is guaranteed to work across processor generations, this approach
is too costly, taking up to 10x sysctl sched min granularity on applications we tested.
An optimization is to do it only on valid virtual addresses for the task being switched out
as was done in [79]. However, this can still be a large range compared to the size of a cache
partition (4− 6MB).
Another approach is to create an eviction set – a set of addresses which when loaded are
guaranteed to evict the entire cache partition. However, the memory-address to cache-line
mapping is proprietary and subject to change across processor generations. Cache-side-
channel attacks also have to contend with this challenge and have addressed it by reverse-
engineering the memory address to cache line mapping for a given micro-architecture [33].
Apart from the one-time cost of reverse engineering, the cost of this approach is equal to
loading memory the size of the cache partition from a linear address space. To evaluate the
performance of such an approach, we use the memory load method.
We perform this state cleansing anytime the security domain is changed, as shown by the
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protocol in Figure 2.10 and the co-scheduling overview in Figure 2.2. To reduce performance
impact in the case of other domains lacking runnable threads (due to blocking on I/O,
etc.), flushing is only performed when PRIVILEGED DOMAIN changes. If only a single security
domain has runnable tasks, no flushing will occur.
2.5.4 Selective Page Sharing
Docker uses a UFS to present a unified view of the several different layers. Of the several
UFS that Docker supports like btrfs [80], overlayfs [81], and AUFS [82], AUFS is mature and
supports all of Docker’s storage feature set. In a UFS, multiple directories on the host are
unified in a single directory called a union mount, without replicating the actual contents
of individual layers. Contents of all the layers become visible at the union mount. Docker
keeps a single copy of each layer on the host file-system and AUFS mounts all the layers to
a single union mount point, which becomes the container’s root file system. Each layer can
be a part of multiple union mounts and thus can be shared across different containers.
Our implementation modifies Docker4, specifically the AUFS storage driver, to transpar-
ently allow selective sharing of file system layers. We modified the AUFS driver to have
separate copies of each layer for each security domain. In this way, no two containers be-
longing to different security domains share any common layers.
2.6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present an evaluation of the performance impact of our core-synchronization
algorithm used during capability transfer. We evaluate overheads in terms of machine-
utilization loss as observed by the cloud provider. We then explore the impact as observed
by cloud tenants. We also explore the memory growth impacts of our selective-sharing
mechanism.
4v1.14.0-dev, compiled from source code available on Github
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2.6.1 Impact of Scheduler Changes
Our prototype implementation is evaluated using a CPU bound workload to determine
the impact on applications in a worst case scenario. Consider a batch workload such as
Hadoop or a web serving workload. The case in which all threads have work and are not
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Figure 2.12: Tenant observable loss in CPU time allocated to each security domain as a
function of the number of security domains. Note this performance degradation only
occurs in the isolated region. The performance impact when there is only a single security
domain is 0, thus is not shown.
The machine is configured as outlined in Section 2.3. We allocate 2 physical cores and 4
logical processors to an isolated cache region. The cache region is 4MB (4 cache ways out
of 20 available on the system). Each security domain is assigned 4 threads, and the number
of domains is varied from 2 to 8. Each domain consists of 4 CPU-bound tasks, 1 for each
logical processor. Measurements are taken using sar and pidstat at an interval of once per
second for 100 seconds. Figure 2.12 shows the overhead normalized to security domain for
the 4 security domain case. The reduction in time spent in userspace per domain is small.
Figure 2.13 shows the overhead of our system running while varying the number of security
domains assigned to an isolated region. System utilization when our system is disabled is
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very near 100% in each case, thus is not shown. It is clear to see that the overheads for
a single logical processor are a function of the system and not of the number of security
domains assigned to a partition. Follower cores can be seen idling during domain changes,
but the overheads never exceed slightly above 20%, with the average case being slightly below
20% on follower processors. From our tests, we know that flushing significantly increases the
performance penalties. The leader core spends the most time executing in system space due
to its responsibility to manage capability transfer and synchronize cores, so this was to be
expected. In the future, we will investigate mechanisms to reduce system time on the leader
core and idle time on follower cores. Hardware based per-partition flushing mechanisms, such
as an enhanced WBINVD, would significantly reduce these overheads, though our approach
would still be needed to enable multiple logical processors in an isolated region. Because the
isolated region suffers ≈ 20% reduction in utilization as visible to the provider, the impact
to tenants within the isolated region will be strictly less. Cloud computing benefits from
over-subscription making these gains possible. Impacts to utilization are amortized across
the security domains assigned to a given isolated region. Figure 2.12 is indicative of tenant
observable application performance, while Figure 2.13 is indicative of the cost to the cloud
provider in terms of lost CPU utilization.
We have not shown the performance impact on schedulable units running outside of an
isolated region. The Linux scheduler runs on a per-core basis, so there is no interference
across core boundaries unless processes are being re-balanced, which we disable across iso-
lated and non-isolated regions. Thus, the only performance impact to schedulable units in
the non-isolated region is due to the reduction in cache sized from 20MB to 16MB. Reduced
cache sizes have little impact on cloud workloads [64].
Hardware based per-partition flushing mechanisms would significantly reduce these over-
heads if such instructions are added by Intel in the future. For example, an instruction like
WBINVD could be made that took a partition id and only flushed the relevant lines in that
partition. This would reduce the amount of system time our approach takes, but would not
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(c) 8 Security Domains
Figure 2.13: Scalability of Isolation Mechanisms with respect to Number of Security
Domains. 4 logical processors are in the isolated region. Per logical-core utilization is
shown for cores in the isolated region with co-scheduling and state cleansing enabled.
eliminate performance impact of strict co-scheduling. Our scheduling approach would still
be beneficial even in the case of hardware-accelerated partition flushing because it would
allow processing being scheduled during an epoch to gain maximal sharing of cache lines as
they all belong to the same security domain. Furthermore, co-scheduling is still necessary
to enable multiple cores within an isolated region regardless of the overhead of partition
flushing. Future research is necessary to determine an effective hardware implementation of
a per-partition flushing mechanism to reduce the system time.
2.6.2 Impact of Shared Memory Reduction
By enabling selective sharing of base layers in Docker, we expect an increase in the memory
footprint of containers as there are multiple copies of pages that would otherwise be shared.
To understand the memory growth vs. the number of security domains, we ran 2 experiments
each with a web server (Apache Tomcat) and an in-memory database (Redis). We used smem
to measure the proportional set size (PSS) per container as it represents realistic memory
usage by only measuring the fair share of the total shared memory. To better understand
PSS, consider two processes that share 50MB of memory and have 10MB of memory that
is unique to each process. PSS would report the memory usage to be the (shared memory
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/ # of processes) + unique memory, thus would be 35 MB for the example given. PSS
is used to highlight the benefits of sharing in the non-modified cases and to show the gains
from selective-sharing within security domains. We also track Resident Set Size (RSS),
which is the total amount of memory used by a process. This allows us to show the cost
of a na¨ıve solution that disables sharing entirely. To make sure that the code is resident in
memory before we take measurements, we send 100 requests to the Apache Tomcat servers
and added 1000 random key-value pairs to each Redis server. We designed our experiments
to be representative of real world deployments of micro-services where multiple containers
of a single type run in a distributed fashion.
We measure how the average memory usage of each container increases as we increase the
number of security domains from 1 to 4. Each security domain has 5 containers. The result
is compared against the same number of containers running without modifications on the
same host (i.e., all the containers share base layers). These measurements are also compared
against a na¨ıve solution in which sharing is disabled all together. We measure the average
memory usage across 50 runs. Figures 2.14 and 2.15 show that memory usage for Redis
increases ≈ 0.45 MB per container in the worst case (4 security domains with 5 containers
each) and for Apache Tomcat only ≈ 1.71 MB per container in the worst case. When looking
at the overall memory consumption of these processes (≈ 7 and ≈ 230 respectively) it is clear
that the additional memory cost per container is marginal. Selective sharing that enables

































Number of Security Domains
Full Sharing Selective Sharing Naïve (No-Sharing)




























Number of Security Domains
Full Sharing Selective Sharing Naïve (No-Sharing)
Figure 2.15: Full Sharing vs. Selective Sharing (Tomcat)
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The results support our claim that the additional cost of selective sharing of memory
is negligible. The increase that we see arises from the duplicate copies of memory pages,
one per security domain, which were shared among all the containers within that domain.
Sharing still occurs between containers belonging to the same security domain which is why
memory growth remains manageable with our modifications.
2.7 CACHE CAPABILITY ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY
In this chapter, we have presented a hardware-software technique that can enforce a cache-
access capability for schedulable units belonging to separate security domains (C1). Unlike
many existing solutions, our solution allows SMT to remain enabled (C2) and does not
require application level changes (C3). We implement our system on top of the Linux CFS
scheduler and present an evaluation of the system under a CPU bound workload. In our
evaluations, we observed a worst case reduction in utilization in the case of 2 security domains
of 9.8% and only 2.97% and 1.68% decrease in utilization for the 4 and 8 security domain
configurations respectively (with 4 logical processors assigned to an isolated partition, as
shown in Figure 2.12) (C4). A user simply notifies the provider that a given workload should
be run in isolation. Our technique can eliminate an attacker’s ability to use the cache as
a noisy communication channel and does not rely on probabilistic methods to decrease the
granularity of information available on the channel (C1).
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Chapter 3: Trustworthy Monitoring and Intrusion Detection
Numerous event-based probing methods exist for cloud computing environments allowing
a hypervisor to gain insight into guest activities. Such event-based probing has been shown
to be useful for detecting attacks, system hangs through watchdogs, and for inserting exploit
detectors before a system can be patched, among others. Here, we illustrate how to use such
probing for trustworthy relationship logging and highlight some of the challenges that exist-
ing event-based probing mechanisms do not address. Challenges include ensuring a probe
inserted at given address is trustworthy despite the lack of attestation available for probes
that have been inserted dynamically. We show how probes can be inserted to ensure proper
logging of every invocation of a probed instruction. When combined with attested boot of
the hypervisor and guest machines, we can ensure the output stream of monitored events
is trustworthy. Leveraging these probing mechanisms we can build trustworthy relationship
monitoring systems to perform capability violation detection.
3.1 SYSTEM CAPABILITIES
Relationship monitoring at the system layer can be used to define and detect violations
of system-level capabilities. These capabilities capture relationships between system-level
subjects such as processes and the files they are capable of accessing or executing. Table 3.1
defines the terms we use when discussing system level capabilities.
Table 3.1: System Capability Definitions
Definition of Term
CP Set of Capabilities for micro-service P
M Set of micro-services
Ccallx,y,.. Capability to execute system call call with arguments x, y, ...
Capabilities at the system-level revolve around system calls as the system call interface
is how micro-services create relationships between system-level subjects. In this chapter,
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we focus on monitoring two system calls, open and execve, but explore the overhead of
more thorough monitoring in Section 3.8.1. Accordingly, we introduce the notion of two
capabilities to be monitored from within the VMM. First, we denote Copenf,p to mean the
capability to execute the open system call with filename f and permissions p. Then we
denote Cexecf to mean the capability to execute the execve system call with binary named
f .
In this chapter, we focus on the ability to place trust in the monitoring of the set of
capabilities, C. We also build a mechanism to allow for easier building of capability lists for
every micro-service a tenant may be deploying, CP ∀ P ∈ M.
3.2 GOALS OF A HYPERVISOR-BASED TRUSTED LOG
We set forward five requirements that must be met to guarantee the integrity of a trusted
log meant to monitor guest VMs. Increasing the integrity and completeness of our trusted log
provides better guarantees for higher level services built using such a log. The requirements
are as follows:
R1 Information provided by the guest cannot alter the logging entity’s control flow. In-
formation is simply logged and higher level services can respond to logged data appro-
priately,
R2 Guests cannot modify or remove an event from the log after the fact,
R3 In-guest modifications to instrumented locations should be logged,
R4 Modifications to functions invoking the hooked instruction should similarly be logged,
R5 The event log must contain every event T of type T if there exists any probe PT in
the set of probes which produces output corresponding to events of type T , up to and
including a malicious action within the guest.
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We also have three design goals that drive the engineering choices behind the architecture
proposed here. These are:
D1 Minimize the performance impact on guests,
D2 Minimize additions to the trusted compute base,
D3 Require no modification of guests (i.e., remain transparent).
3.3 BACKGROUND
Below we describe the technologies being used to help meet the requirements listed above.
By utilizing and extending these existing techniques, we meet our design goals and increase
resilience against attacks.
3.3.1 Hardware Assisted Virtualization
The x86 architecture was not originally designed with virtualization in mind, but as VMs
became popular, hardware manufacturers looked at ways to improve their performance and
robustness. Both AMD and Intel have released support for Hardware Assisted Virtualization
(HAV) in the form of extensions to the x86 instruction set.
HAV allows a VM to execute instructions natively on the hypervisor’s CPU(s). However,
the hypervisor must maintain control of the VM’s execution. When the CPU is executing
a VM’s instructions, VMExit events are generated for any privileged operations that the
VM attempts. A VMExit transfers control from the VM to the hypervisor, allowing the
hypervisor to perform any necessary operations before returning control back to the VM.
While allowing for robust and simplified hypervisor software, VMExit’s do incur perfor-
mance overhead. Historically, one of the major causes of overhead in HAV was due to page
faults in the VM. In early HAV implementations, every page fault would result in a VMExit
since the guest could not control its own page tables. To alleviate this, vendors introduced
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a technique called two-dimensional page tables (TDP). In this paper we utilize Intel’s TDP
implementation, known as Extended Page Tables (EPT). The techniques apply to AMD’s
equivalent Nested Page Tables.
EPT allows VMs to manage their own page tables by managing guest-physical to host-
physical address translations in hardware, effectively eliminating VMExit’s on page faults.
Similar to conventional x86 page tables, EPT also provides a set of access flags that can be
set at the page level: execute enable, write enable, and read enable. A VMExit is triggered on
accesses that violate the access flags due to an EPT violation. We later show how EPT access
flags can be used to guarantee that probing systems do not miss events of interest occurring
within the guest immediately after guest boot, helping to fulfill R5. For more information
on EPT we refer the reader to Volume 3 of the Intel Software Development Manuals [83]; for
AMD’s equivalent NPT the reader can refer to Volume 2 of AMD’s Programmer Manual [84].
3.3.2 Virtual Machine Monitor Based Probing
The research community has shown that timer based guest introspection (passive moni-
toring) can be circumvented by a malicious or compromised guest [85, 86]. We avoid this
issue by using event-based monitoring. Here, we highlight the mechanism used to enable
such logging. Event-based probing using debugging techniques has been proposed and ap-
plied in a number of different contexts [87–90]. Lengyel et al. use event-based probing for
dynamic analysis of malware with the goal of remaining undetected during monitoring [87].
Estrada et al. show the effectiveness of similar techniques for reliability and security mon-
itoring [89, 91]. XenProbes uses the technique for profiling performance inside guests [88]
and Spider uses it for stealthy debugging [90].
All of these approaches utilize HAV to invoke VMExits upon execution of int3 (0xCC)
instructions in the guest. The key feature of event-based probing is that an instruction
within an untrusted environment can be replaced by an instruction (int3 in this case)
that causes a hardware enforced trap (i.e., a VMExit) to transfer control flow to a trusted
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environment. After guest inspection is done, the original instruction is executed within the
guest and the breakpoint is re-inserted before guest execution resumes. Because probes
cause a VMExit, which is an expensive operation, one must carefully design services built
on such probes to reduce the number of exit events while also ensuring enough information
is available to allow meaningful services be developed utilizing the logged data. We do not
consider the event-based approached used by LibVMI [92] as it invokes a VMExit on every
single instruction in the target page for the logged event. Such an approach causes high
overhead and is intractable due to our performance requirement D1. Our approach gives
users the flexibility to determine the overhead paid based on the level of protection deemed
necessary for a given application.
3.3.3 The Semantic Gap
Any Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) application must cross the “Semantic Gap”
- the gap faced by developers of code running within the VMM that must inspect guest
memory with no knowledge of the kernel data structures or memory layout of the guest.
Much research has been done in this area, and we point the reader to the overview done
by Hebbal et al. for a more thorough discussion of the issue and many of the proposed
solutions [93]. For this work, we assume that the address of the sys exec and sys open
calls in Linux, along with the offset at which the Linux kernel .text addressing begins are
provided (this memory mapping is well documented [94]). The latter is needed in order to
identify the guest physical locations of the above functions, which are loaded into memory
before paging is enabled in the guest. In Section 3.5 we discuss in more detail why this is
necessary.
We favor the approach of querying System.Map for the location of relevant functions due
to ease of access; this approach has shown to be successful in the literature for providing a
low cost method for crossing the semantic gap [88,95,96]. We limit our discussion to Linux
guests as the open source nature of Linux lends itself to easier distribution of VAs, the focus
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of our IDS, but a similar approach of querying the debug symbols for the Windows kernel
has also been met with success [87,96].
3.3.4 Virtual Appliances
VAs are a popular method for deploying micro-services. One can simply choose an appli-
ance from a list of images made available on a cloud provider’s marketplace and immediately
deploy services such as databases or web servers with minimal configuration. The tuned na-
ture of these appliances makes their behavior more predicable than a VM used for general
purpose computation. In this paper we present an IDS that leverages the “appliance” na-
ture of cloud based deployments of micro-services instantiated using VAs. The IDS is built
using guest-event driven hypervisor-level probes to deliver relevant information to the policy
compliance layer.
A typical deployment of a cloud based web application may have a reverse proxy routing
requests to an application processing layer, each of which communicate with a database
before returning a response. Each of these services would be a different VA. We envision
a system for which different policies protect each kind of VA. In our example, there there
would be three main policies, one for the reverse proxy VA, one for the database VA and one
for the VAs which serve as the application server(s). Policies can share rules if VAs are built
using the same base distribution as a single distribution will have the same cron binaries
running, for example. While policies are stackable, the main advantages reside in the policies
for each that differ, allowing for good coverage while limiting false positives. For example, a
database server running MySQL should never execute a shell outside of configuration events;
our monitoring system would detect such an operation as a violation. The event log can
then also be used as compliance monitoring during configuration periods, and could serve
as a method to detect insider threats attempting to re-configure applications in an attempt
to cause unstable behavior.
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3.4 ATTACK MODEL AGAINST THE LOGGING SYSTEM
Keeping the above technologies in mind, we motivate our design choices using the attack
model and assumptions presented in this section to improve the resilience of the logging
system. We assume that the hypervisor is a trusted entity and that the hypervisor side of
the logging framework is secure. For the log file itself, a simple way to provide guarantees is
to use remote logging, or approaches used in literature [97]. Here, we focus on the elements
of logging that must be in place to facilitate proper logging of a guest that may become
malicious at some point after boot.
We assume that the hypervisor is using trusted boot, thus the integrity can be attested.
Additionally, we assume that guests running on the hypervisor are also using attested boot
mechanisms, such as those presented in [98] and [99], and that guest kernels are known,
non-malicious builds of Linux. This allows the hypervisor to guarantee the integrity of any
guest kernel before the guest boots. We assume that the guest kernel is not malicious until
after the first user-space program runs. This is a reasonable assumption as attempts to
exploit a kernel will come from software loaded after boot (either malicious software will be
loaded or vulnerable software exploited).
Attacks can include loading kernel modules, modification of the kernel in place, or attempts
to circumvent logging through process tampering (more details in Attack A2). An attacker
may try and copy the page of memory with the replaced instruction, fix said instruction,
and redirect system calls to this new page. Such a redirect would either require modification
of the Interrupt Descriptor Table in memory that is referenced by the general system call
handler or may come as a write to a hardware register in an effort to circumvent the code
block executed after an interrupt.
To protect the integrity of an event placed at a given location, we must protect the entire
stack trace leading up to the execution of that event. In this chapter, we are primarily


















Figure 3.2: Timing Constraints for Interrupt Attack (A2)
the logging system concerns protecting against any modification of the steps leading up
to the invocation of the monitored system call handler as highlighted by Figure 3.1. The
figure shows the hardware invocation of the system call code block, the location of which
is designated by values stored in hardware registers. During execution of the general system
call handler, interrupts are re-enabled (shown in Figure 3.2). The general system call handler
transfers control to the specific handler through the sys call table. Our goal is to place
probes on the first instruction of the specific handler. With that in mind, consider the
following list of attacks that could circumvent logging:
A1 Write to either the IDTR register (for legacy int $80 based system calls) or various
MSRs for so called “fast” system calls to force the hardware to invoke a malicious code
block after interrupts. (See Section 3.6 for a more detailed discussion of the specific
registers).
A2 Coordinate an interrupt after a system call (that is being logged) is made and interrupts
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have been re-enabled, but before the specific system call handler has been invoked.
Upon interruption, modify the thread struct of the system call invoking process to
point to a different system call handler upon being re-scheduled. The timing constraint
of this attack is highlighted by Figure 3.2.
A3 Rewrite the general system call handler to reference a new, attacker supplied, Interrupt
Descriptor Table.
A4 Rewrite the entry for the specific system call being hooked in the Interrupt Descriptor
Table to point to an attacker supplied handler for the system call.
A5 Rewrite replaced instruction(s) with the original instruction.
A6 Simulate a system call interface using an alternative means of communication between
userspace and a root-kit
In section 3.6 we highlight how attacks can be accounted for through hardware enforced
events. It is worth noting here that A2 has tight timing constraints (an interrupt would
have to occur within a 12 instruction window). We later discuss how removing the protection
guarantees for A2 greatly reduces the performance impact and we believe it has minimal
effects on the overall trustworthiness of our logging architecture. While we do not currently
defend against A6 style attacks, we believe our system greatly increases the cost of attack
while providing good detection coverage of many of the attacks that might try and circumvent
logging.
3.5 TRUSTWORTHY LOG ACQUISITION
With our attack model in place, we now discuss the specifics of the logging mechanism. In
particular, we discuss how and where probes are inserted. The algorithm for guaranteeing
a probe is inserted before the execution of the probed instruction is introduced and the





















Figure 3.3: Event Driven Probe Architecture
Figure 3.3 highlights the mechanism to probe the Linux kernel system calls sys exec and
sys open. An event-based probing mechanism is utilized to replace instructions in the guest
kernel [89], ensuring information is logged anytime the affected functions are called, fulfilling
R2.
To ensure that any attempt to modify a probe is logged (R3) we use EPTs to remove write
permissions for the affected page, register a callback to handle these EPT violations, and
within the callback handler only log attempts to modify the affected page if the violation
occurs for the guest virtual address on which we inserted the probe. While performance
monitoring within the guest might cause non-malicious writes to locations of logging probes,
an administrator would know the event is benign. Event classification is left to higher level
services; we guarantee only that modification events do appear in the log. Logging code
remains small, making formal verification more feasible. There are only 72 and 41 lines
of code for our sys exec logger and sys open logger respectively (not including the code
required to insert the probes), keeping in line with D2.
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3.5.2 Log Completeness
We have defined log completeness to mean that our logging service guarantees that every
invocation of a probed event be present in the log. In order to ensure log completeness and
fulfill R5 we must place probes in their respective locations before the instructions at those
locations are executed. While we can guarantee this, it may be possible for an attacker
to perform system call like actions, all together bypassing probed instructions (A6). The
system calls being probed will be loaded at a predictable location within the guest physical
memory (as noted in Linux’s memory mapping documentation [94]). The knowledge of
these locations allows us to determine the page number indicating the page containing the
target instruction, which we use to watch for EPT violations of any guest physical address
that occurs on the same page as an instruction of interest during the guest boot sequence.
We are able to watch for such violations by utilizing a callback handler that gets invoked
after we have allowed KVM to perform any necessary actions to handle the violation. Upon
observing the first write violation for any address within the page of interest, we remove the
execute bit from that page, allowing our callback handler to be invoked if any instruction
on the page is executed. Subsequently, upon observation of any instruction execution on
the page of interest, we know that the remaining code for that page must be loaded and
can safely insert the probe. Having inserted the probe, we restore EPT permissions to allow
execution and remove our checks for EPT violations due to execution exceptions on the page
in which the probe is inserted as the checks are only required as the final step before probe
insertion. By inserting probes in this manner during boot of guests, we are able to ensure
log completeness and log every call to these two system calls, even while the first userspace
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Figure 3.4: Induced EPT Signature & Probe Insertion
3.5.3 Implications of an Untrusted Guest
Finally, we must ensure that the actions taken within the probe do not place unwarranted
trust in data obtained from the guest (R1). For example, our sys exec logger logs two
variable length string arrays. While these strings are typically \0 terminated, the guest
could point the probe to a location with an arbitrarily large number of bytes before a \0
is encountered. To protect against copying strings from guest memory, we only copy 500
bytes and place a \0 at the 500th byte. While we may log garbage data in cases of an
intentionally malicious guest and may truncate binary names in the case of exceptionally
long, but legitimate, calls to sys exec, this is a necessary trade off to ensure the probing
interface remains resilient. Potential for truncating can be seen again when iterating through
variable length arrays, which should be NULL terminated. We only iterate over up to 50
entries and exit iteration if NULL is encountered (in a legitimate case) and stop at 50 in
the case of a malicious guest pointing the probe to a random memory location. Again,
this has the side effect of potentially truncating logged arguments. In our experiments, we
never truncated any legitimate data. The length decisions did not impact the ability to
log meaningful data. Regardless of whether or not arguments are truncated, we are able to
protect the logging facility from the attacks listed above.
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3.6 LOGGED EVENTS
Choosing which events to log is critical to increasing resilience against the attacks listed
in Section 3.4 and detect capability violations. Here, we show which events should be logged
and how each event type can be used to improve resilience.
In addition to the information listed for each event type as defined below, all events also
include the hostname of the KVM hypervisor on which the event occurs, a timestamp for
the event, and the vmid (the qemu-kvm process id of the VM on the host on which the event
is logged).
The five event types currently in our system, and information collected unique to each
type, are as follows:
• Tmod - Address modification events containing:
– gva - A long integer indicating the guest virtual address being modified.
The next two events log activity of interest and are useful for facilitating detection of
abnormal actions.
• Tse - sys exec events containing:
– filename - a \0 delineated string.
– argv - a NULL delineated variable length array containing string pointers.
– envp - a NULL delineated variable length array containing string pointers.
• Tso - sys open events containing:
– filename - a \0 delineated string.
– flags - an integer flags variable indicating options for the file.
– mode - an integer indicating the mode for the file being opened.
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The following two events are unique to logging system calls and increase the cost of
circumventing the logging mechanism. These require additional callbacks be provided by the
underlying probing framework. To prove viability, we have implemented the wrmsr event
for modern system calls. These two events are not currently provided by any event-based
monitoring framework discussed in the literature [87–89] as they only become necessary when
providing defenses for system call monitoring.
• Tlidt - lidt event. Triggered on execution of the lidt (Load interrupt descriptor table)
x86 instruction.
• Twrmsr - wrmsr event. Triggered on execution of the wrmsr (Write Model Specific
Register) x86 instruction.
These two events are hardware enforced; once the hypervisor has configured the processor
to trap these calls, their execution will always force a VMExit. The lidt trap can be
configured by setting bit 2 (Descriptor Table Exiting) of the IA32 VMX PROCBASED CTLS2
MSR to 1 within the hypervisor before VMs are started. Similarly, writes to MSRs within
the guests can be trapped by ensuring bit 28 of the same MSR is 1 and then configuring
the MSR bitmap field in the Virtual Machine Control Structure to only cause VMExits
on writes to the specific registers that need monitoring. This ensures that performance
overhead remains low by not inducing VMExits for writes to every MSR. For int $80 based
system calls, the lidt trap is sufficient. For sysenter invoked system calls, the three MSRs
IA32 SYSENTER {ES, EIP, ESP} must be monitored through the wrmsr trap. Finally, for
syscall invoked system calls, the MSR IA32 LSTAR must be monitored with the wrmsr trap.
The registers listed above are used to register Interrupt Service Routines (ISRs) with the
processor. In Linux, these point to the general system call handler. The performance impact
of these two events should be negligible under normal operation as these events occur only
during boot of the guest kernel and during configuration of MSRs.
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3.6.1 Detection of Attacks on the Logging System
Let us now consider how these event types can facilitate detection of the attacks against
the logging facility listed above. We protect against attacks A5, A3, and A4 by properly
removing the write enable bits for the pages containing the instruction modified, the general
system call handler, and the interrupt descriptor table and listening to events of type Tmod.
The event Tmod is hardware enforced by EPT. Attempts to modify pages for which the write
enable bit has been removed will trigger a VMExit through an EPT violation. Attacks that
try to change the ISR for system calls (A1 above) can be logged with events of type Tlidt and
Twrmsr. Finally, careful placement of probes can ensure that logging occurs before interrupts
have been re-enabled by placing the probe on the general system call handler, mitigating
attack A2. Mitigating A2 does have high performance impact as we discuss in Section 3.7;
we believe placing the probe at the specific system call handlers is a reasonable trade-off
as attacks of this kind must meet a tight timing constraint. Finally, if an attacker can
compromise the guest kernel it would be possible to recreate a separate system call interface
(A6). Consider a root-kit that finds the task struct of the userspace process it is hiding.
It could poll the memory of the process for system call like arguments and then execute a
separate code block, performing the same actions as a system call. Such an attack may be
possible to detect by monitoring timing interrupts. Future work can explore ways to use
event-based probing to further protect the guest kernel against attacks of this kind.
Note that many more event types are possible as event-based probing provides a trusted
mechanism with which to hook any kernel function. But in keeping with D1 and D2, we
choose to keep this number small.
3.6.2 Event Logging Format
All probe output is placed into the VMM’s /var/log/kern.log. Output is processed by
a user-space application that builds and processes events. This design is shown in Figure
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3.5. In order to allow for easier processing by higher level applications, we adhere to a JSON
like format when doing logging within the host kernel.
A log sample for a touch text.log event is shown in Listing 3.1.
Listing 3.1: Example sys open Probe Output
{”VMID” : 1884 , ”LOGGER” : ”SYS OPEN LOGGER” , ”KIND” : ”BEGIN”}
{”VMID” : 1884 , ”LOGGER” : ”SYS OPEN LOGGER” ,
”KIND” : ”ARG” ,”ARG NAME” : ” f i l ename ” , ”VALUE” : ” t e s t . t ex t ”}
{”VMID” : 1884 , ”LOGGER” : ”SYS OPEN LOGGER” ,
”KIND” : ”ARG” , ”ARG NAME” : ” f l a g s ” , ”VALUE” : ”0 x941 ”}
{”VMID” : 1884 , ”LOGGER” : ”SYS OPEN LOGGER” ,
”KIND” : ”ARG” , ”ARG NAME” : ”mode” , ”VALUE” : ”0x1b6”}
{”VMID” : 1884 , ”LOGGER” : ”SYS OPEN LOGGER” , ”KIND” : ”END”}
The TIMESTAMP, HOSTNAME and LOG ID are also included and are set by the printk function
within the hypervisor. We trust these fields to be accurate when read by higher level tools.
The accuracy of these fields is important as will be discussed in the next section on the
development of higher level tools.
For each event, we have a BEGIN statement and an END statement. Everything in between
those statements make up the body of the event and are used to log parameters read from
the guest.
3.7 INTRUSION DETECTION FOR MICRO-SERVICES
To highlight our approach to services built on top of an event based log, we have developed
an IDS which triggers alerts on violations of capability lists. The checks are performed on
filenames passed to guest sys exec and sys open calls to enforce the capabilities described
in Section 3.1. To enable ease of use, we have also built a policy recorder that translates
guest events to white-list capability sets during the recording or learning phase.
64
Output Log
TIME: VMID: X, …, LOGGER: SYS_EXEC, BEGIN
TIME: VMID: X, …, LOGGER: SYS_EXEC, ARG
TIME: VMID: X, …, LOGGER: SYS_EXEC, END
…

























Event 𝜀1 -> Policy P1
…
Event 𝜀2 -> Policy P2
Figure 3.5: Trustworthy-Log Driven IDS Architecture
3.7.1 IDS Architecture
The architecture of our intrusion detection system is shown in Figure 3.5. Raw probe logs
are transferred from kernel to user space using the /var/log/ kern.log interface. From
there, the logs are placed in a buffer as they are read from the file. An ioctl interface to
/var/log/kern.log is used to ensure updates are pushed to the user space application as
soon as probes write to the file. Within the user space event parser, buffers must be used to
ensure that output from a probe P 1so into guest G1 do not become integrated into an event
2 from the output of the probe P
2
so placed into guest G2, as the arrival of such logs may be
intermingled within /var/log/kern.log. This is ensured by placing all logs from a given
probe into a unique buffer identified by the LOGGER TYPE,HOSTNAME,VMID sequence. Since
the buffer being used is determined by this sequence of values, these values must be set by
the hypervisor. No value read from the guest is used to identify a probed event or which
buffer in which to place a logged statement, ensuring the guest can not impact actions taken
by the logging system. For now, we do not consider multiple vCPU guests, thus only need
to worry about intermingling between guests. In the case of multiple vCPUs, the vCPU
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id would also need to be used as a unique identifier as it would be possible that a probed
location be called from multiple vCPUs simultaneously. This limitation is partly due to the
chosen probing framework, other frameworks [87] would support multiple vCPU guests.
3.7.2 Policy Generation
After event parsing is complete, processed events are passed to either a policy recording
layer or an alert system for our IDS. The policy recording system allows an administrator
to build capability sets by recording standard behavior for a VA in terms of white-listing
the actions taken during policy recording. Listing 3.2 shows an example policy built us-
ing our policy recorder while executing the which command on a guest under inspection.
Currently, white-lists are separated from attackers executing in the guest by the VMM. Con-
tinuous integration test suites could be used to generate polices through this policy recording
mechanism.
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Listing 3.2: Example which.policy file
{ ” p o l i c i e s ” : [
{” exec ” : {” type ” : ” w h i t e l i s t ” ,” f i l ename ” : ”/ usr / bin /which ”}} ,
{”open ” : {” type ” : ” w h i t e l i s t ” ,” a c c e s s t y p e ” :
” read ” , ” f i l ename ” : ”/ e t c / ld . so . cache ”}} ,
{”open ” : {” type ” : ” w h i t e l i s t ” ,” a c c e s s t y p e ” :
” read ” , ” f i l ename ” :
”/ l i b /x86 64−l inux−gnu/ l i b c . so . 6”}} ,
{”open ” : {” type ” : ” w h i t e l i s t ” ,” a c c e s s t y p e ” :
” read ” , ” f i l ename ” : ”/ usr / bin /which ”}} ]}
3.7.3 Threat Analysis
We note that there are certain limitations to our approach that would allow an attacker to
commit a malicious action without being logged. Consider a vulnerable binary running on
a system that is compromised through a buffer overflow attack. Assuming the attacker does
not crash the binary, it would be possible to run code under the guise of an already executing
process. As long as the payload never opened a file or executed another binary, it would
go unlogged. While any such process hijacking will go unlogged, our approach substantially
reduces the actions that can be taken by an attacker. Adding a separate event for system calls
dealing with network access would further mitigate the possibility that a malicious payload
is able to do any useful work without being logged. Our approach is complimentary to
and can be combined with other defense-in-depth approaches such as ASLR, non-executable
heaps and other defenses to increase the cost of implementing a successful attack.
3.8 EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate both the impact of the probes on the performance of the guest
and on the ability of the IDS to detect attacks on applications running in VAs. The IDS is
evaluated against a real world attack on a popular cloud based web application.
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3.8.1 Performance
To evaluate the overhead of our probing mechanisms driven by guest events, we run three
benchmarks that are representative of cloud workloads. These include:
• Apache Bench - a benchmark for the Apache web server [100],
• Redis Bench - a benchmark for the in memory data store [101],
• OpenSSL Profiling - used to understand the impact on encrypted communication
within guests.
These tests were chosen because they represent a disk-read heavy workload (Apache),
network heavy workload (Redis, Apache), and a CPU heavy workload (OpenSSL). Cloud
applications will often call in-memory caches before sending a response using Apache con-
figured with OpenSSL. All tests are configured using the Phoronix Test Suite and are run
90 times each. The first 30 runs are performed with our trusted probes loaded and then
run 30 times without. The last 30 runs are done while having probes loaded at the general
system call handler, before interrupts have been re-enabled in the guest to highlight the
performance penalty paid while protecting against A2. Figure 3.6 shows the results for
both Apache Bench and for OpenSSL. Apache bench results are in terms of requests served
per second and those for OpenSSL are in terms of signatures generated per second, but
here both have been normalized to highlight the percentage decrease in performance caused
by probing. Looking at the first two bars in Figure 3.6, it is easy to see the performance
implications of placing probes at the generic system call handler. In the case of the spe-
cific handler (the first bar), we see less than 10% overhead. But Apache has about a 55%
overhead when placing the probe at the general handlers. The next two bars highlight how
probing has little impact on the performance of OpenSSL, regardless of probe location. This
is because OpenSSL does not have to interact with the kernel as much as Apache and Redis
to complete its workload. OpenSSL works by loading a key in memory and then generates
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signatures using that key. It is up to another process, Apache for example, to write out any



























Figure 3.6: Apache Bench and OpenSSL Overhead Relative to Running with no Probing.
Figure 3.7 is for the Redis benchmark, which runs five separate request types against the
in memory data store. As seen from the “B” bars in the figure, the performance overhead
of probing specific handlers when compared to no probing, the “A” bars, is negligible. The
“C” bars for each query type show the high performance impact of defending against A2,
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Figure 3.7: Redis Benchmark Overhead for 5 Redis Operations. (A) without probing the
guest, (B) probing only the specific system call handlers, and (C) probing the general
system call handler.
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In the case of hooking specific system call handlers, it is clear to see that overheads remain
tolerable (less than 10%), because we are only probing two guest kernel functions. The
overheads are large when protecting against A2 though, around 55% for Apache and 75%
for Redis. Apache and Redis are both opening sockets and sending data over the network,
which is why we see a much higher penalty being paid when hooking the generic system
call handler. We feel that the protections against A5, A3, A4, A1 (requirements D3 and
R4) go a long way in protecting the specific system call handler, substantially reducing the
unloggable attack space when hooking only the specific system call handlers.
3.8.2 IDS Evaluation
We evaluate the efficacy of the IDS built on top of our trusted logging platform by looking
at real world exploits for motivation. In a recent attack on the website for the Linux
distribution Linux Mint [102], attackers were able to gain shell access as the www-data user,
the user typically reserved for only running the httpd process [103]. The attack exploited a
vulnerability in the popular blogging framework, Wordpress. Wordpress is representative of
a typical cloud application as it can be deployed on many VAs to enable horizontal scalability.
To see how our system would have handled such an attack, we installed a copy of Wordpress
with a typical plugin and attacked the setup using Wordpress Vulnerability Database ID
#8209 [104].
We first setup a Wordpress application server and separate database server to act as our
VAs. Since our IDS supports policy stacking, we are able to record a separate policy for
Wordpress and use the dhcp.policy file common to all VAs built using the same base
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS distribution. The dhcp.policy file was auto-generated by running our
policy generation tool against the log output of a default Ubuntu install. Including that
policy is necessary as it removes the chance of false positives every time a dhcp lease renewal
is performed. It would not be necessary for VAs using static IP’s. An abridged version of the
Wordpress policy file is shown in Listing 3.3. Our policy recording utility auto-generated a
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policy that served as a starting point and then we used knowledge about proper Wordpress
installs to fine tune the policy. For example, the policy recording utility produced many
single filename: /var/www/html/*.php entries. We removed these and converted it into
a single directory: /var/www/html entry as shown on the first line of the policy in the
listing.
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Listing 3.3: Abridged wordpress.policy file
{”open ” : {” type ” : ” w h i t e l i s t ” ,” a c c e s s t y p e ” : ” read ” ,
” d i r e c t o r y ” : ”/ var /www/html ”}} ,
{”open ” : {” type ” : ” w h i t e l i s t ” ,” a c c e s s t y p e ” : ” c r e a t e ” ,
” d i r e c t o r y ” : ”/ var /www/html/wp−content / uploads ”}} ,
{”open ” : {” type ” : ” w h i t e l i s t ” ,” a c c e s s t y p e ” : ” mod i f i c a t i on ” ,
” d i r e c t o r y ” : ”/ var /www/html/wp−content / uploads ”}} ,
{”open ” : {” type ” : ” w h i t e l i s t ” ,” a c c e s s t y p e ” : ” read ” ,
” d i r e c t o r y ” : ”/ var /www/html/wp−content / uploads ”}} ,
{”open ” : {” type ” : ” w h i t e l i s t ” ,” a c c e s s t y p e ” : ” c r e a t e ” ,
” d i r e c t o r y ” : ”/ var /www/html/wp−content / p lug in s ”}} ,
We exploit the vulnerability using Metasploit [105] to determine if our alerting system is
able to capture capability lists violations. Because the exploit works by injecting arbitrary
PHP code, we can only detect attacks that use PHP to access other files on the system
(outside of the /var/www/html directory) or execute system binaries. We detect the exploit
after the attacker performs an action anomalous to the hijacked process. In this case, the
attack is detected upon attacker execution of a shell, as /bin/sh should never execute on
the system. We could detect the exploit sooner by adding an extra probe to sys socket.
While we have demonstrated the IDS on one example, it has shown the viability of our
technique. Our approach relies on the fact that many exploits require a binary to load and
execute on a system. If the exploit does not run in a separate process, as is the case in the
example given above, the attacker will likely either execute a system binary or open a file,
revealing malicious activity. For instance, the loading of kernel modules could be audited by
looking at events of type Tse with filename equal to insmod. This would potentially reveal
the loading of a root-kit by enforcing kernel module loading capabilities. Payloads executed
through process hijacking can explore the full system call interface and potentially exploit
the running kernel. Such an event would not be logged, though any attempt to remove our
probe using such an exploit would be noted in the log. This increases the burden of carrying
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out successful attacks as malicious payloads will have to be carried out within a vulnerable
binary or the kernel to remain undetected. Future work could explore creating capabilities
and probes for the most vulnerable locations within the Linux kernel by evaluating past
exploits.
3.9 RELATED WORK
Huh et al. discuss a trusted logging architecture for grid computing using Xen [97].
Their approach relies on logging events as they are intercepted by Xen device drivers. Our
trusted logging is more flexible as any action within the guest can be logged on instruction
execution. Additionally, the authors propose an extensive architecture for guaranteeing the
log is not fabricated by the provider. We view this work as complementary. Thus far, we have
focused on trust related issues related to log generation and can utilize similar techniques
for improving trustworthiness.
Crawford et al. discuss a methodology for detecting insider threats that relies on scanning
the memory of running virtual machines every 30 minutes [106]. As we discussed earlier,
polling techniques such as this are limited in that they are easily circumvented, giving
attackers a 30 minute window in which to perform malicious activities. Kienzle et al. explore
using VMI techniques for endpoint configuration compliance, but require the compliance
audit package run in a separate VM, increasing the resources of the monitor [107]. Their
approach to compliance also relies on polling, thus can be circumvented. Our approach
provides a trusted log which is guaranteed to capture every event probed. Our work can
be extended to perform compliance checks of Mandatory Access Control systems running
within guests. Win et al. propose using VMI to provide additional layers of security for a
similar system, but rely on information from a trusted in-guest monitoring agent to report
relevant accesses to a trusted compliance layer VM [108]. Our approach places no trust in
the guest after the initial kernel is loaded using an attestation technique provided by a TPM.
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KvmSec is a security extension for KVM, but relies on probes running in untrusted guests
[109]. Our approach places no trust in the guest. In “Space Traveling across VM” [110],
the authors cross the semantic gap by relying on an additional virtual machine from which
to run probes. This approach has a large overhead, thus would violate R6. Techniques like
“Virtuoso” are complimentary to our trusted log and could be used to inform future probes
of relevant locations within the guest for probing [111]. With regards to work related to
IDS, Kosoresow and Hofmeyr show the effectiveness of system call traces by using temporal
patterns of system calls to detect intrusions [112]. While the IDS presented here relies upon
white-listing, their technique could also be applied.
HIMA [113] provides run time integrity checking of userspace programs. The authors
monitor system calls to enable these integrity checks. Their approach used a much older
VMM that generated VMExits for every interrupt, thus the authors paid minimal overheads
during monitoring. Modern hardware does not exit on every interrupt, thus we utilize event-
based probing to monitor specific system calls.
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Chapter 4: Intra-Application Capabilities for Micro-Services
As discussed in our chapter on IDS tuned for micro-services, detecting intra-service attacks
are difficult because abnormal behavior may never access data outside of the service. In this
chapter we address this limitation by exploring runtime integrity checking for applications
running in the cloud. Specifically, we explore runtime integrity violations of high value
assets such as databases and reverse proxies as these are cornerstones to scale out workloads
common to micro-service deployments.
While our IDS is effective at detecting common attack payloads, it is unable to detect
attacks that reside entirely within the vulnerable binary. The focus of the IDS is to detect
abnormal behavior of binaries, say reading /etc/shadow, at a system level. Attacks on
specific systems, such as a web server, may be able to access sensitive information without
ever leaving the binary. Consider username and passwords being sent to a web server. If an
attacker can divert control flow within the web server, these could be captured. These two
approaches complement each other. Any attempt at Control Flow Integrity (CFI) will not
detect system level changes which are still useful to check for improper configurations and
insider threats.
In this chapter, we build a provenance engine for the C abstract machine that can gen-
erate memory access capabilities for instruction flows. These instruction to memory access
capability lists can be used to augment CFI methods.
4.1 FINE GRAINED CAPABILITIES
A micro-service can modify its subject domain through the use of relationships as discussed
in Chapter 1. These relationships may be functions of internal state as shown by R3 in
Figure 1.1. The goal of this chapter is to produce instruction to memory region modification
capability lists for any memory region that can modify the micro-service’s subject domain.
Table 4.1 defines the terms we use when discussing fine-grained capabilities within a micro-
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service.
Table 4.1: Fine-Grained Capabilities Definitions
Definition of Term
I Set of memory related instructions (allocation, modification)
CI Set of capabilities indicating the memory regions a given
instruction I is allowed to modify
U Set of sensitive usages
UM Sensitive use of memory buffer M
I Instruction I that allocates, writes to, or copies to an address
CM Capability to influence memory region M
Our goal is to identify “sensitive” memory regions that impact the relationships, discussed
in detail in Section 4.4.1, and then protect those regions by identifying which instructions
hold the capability to influence those select regions. We use the word “influence” because
an instruction may modify a given memory buffer that is then used as the source of a copy
function that writes into a sensitive buffer. We aim to capture these instructions and produce
capabilities for them as well as instructions that write directly to sensitive areas.
4.2 BACKGROUND
Memory protection in type unsafe languages is needed because application vulnerabilities,
such as buffer overflows, allow an attacker to craft an exploit that can overwrite function
pointers or return addresses, diverting control flow from the application writer’s original
intent. In recent years, this has become much more difficult with the rise of Data Execution
Prevention (DEP) [114] now accelerated by most hardware platforms by bit-permissions on
individual pages. DEP makes it impossible to use a buffer overflow to write shell-code into
memory and then direct control flow to the data region. In response, attackers began using
“code-reuse” attacks such as ROP [115] to redirect control flow after overwriting a return
address on the stack and Jump Oriented Programming (JOP) [116] by overwriting a function
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pointer. Often, an attacker’s ROP payload simply disables DEP before directing control flow
to a larger payload. The payloads are built using what are known as “gadgets” that perform
some operation and end in either a return or jump to an attacker controlled pointer. DEP
has since been augmented by Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [117] which
attempts to make it harder to divert control flow to valid functions by randomizing the
memory locations of functions and gadgets. This has numerous problems; a memory read
vulnerability, such as use after free, can be used to leak an address, the offset of which can
be used to calculate the addresses of gadgets important to attackers. Attacks on ASLR use
memory leaks and side-channels to enable ROP attacks [118–121]. Attacks have now become
probabilistic and depend on how well addresses can be predicted and attacks tuned to the
new information at runtime.
CFI attempts to mitigate the inherit security risks associated with type-unsafe languages
stemming from the lack of memory safety [122]. Transparent recompilation enabling full
memory safety remains impractical due to high overheads [123, 124]. The concept of CFI
was originally introduced by Abadi et al. [122] and focuses on enforcing a valid Control-
Flow-Graph (CFG) instead of enforcing full memory safety. Current approaches to CFI
attempt to apply a less-strict approximation of CFI by only ensuring that control flow can
be transferred to a list of approved locations [125], but these approaches continue to be
vulnerable [126]. Existing approaches rely on static analysis and instrumentation in an
effort to drive adoption at low performance impact. It has been suggested in literature
numerous times that some form of runtime checking be performed to increase the efficacy of
CFI approximations, and it is generally accepted that full CFG enforcement comes at too
high performance penalty [122,126].
CFI works by enforcing a given CFG, usually derived using a static points-to analysis
such as DSA [127], Andersen’s [128], or Steensgaards [129]. The flexibility of C/C++, such
as that provided by void pointer casting, causes inaccuracies in the CFG’s produced by
points-to analysis algorithms. These inaccuracies are due to the same language features that
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cause the security challenges that CFI tries to protect against. Control Jujutsu shows that a
CFG produced by DSA, the most accurate point-to analysis algorithm, remains vulnerable
to attacks [26]. The authors of Control Flow Bending go a step further and evaluate attacks
under a hypothetical ideal CFG, one that contains only edges intended by the original
programmer and show that attacks are still possible [25].
The root cause of the attacks presented in Control Flow Bending and Control Jujutsu
is carefully crafted memory corruption such that an attacker can achieve control of the
system while remaining within the CFG. For example, if the buffer being passed into exeve’s
filename argument is allocated on the heap, then the attacker simply has to find a heap
overflow to setup an attack. The attacker can execute arbitrary programs on the host if
execve is being executed within a function that is called via a function pointer. The authors
call these types of functions “Argument Corruptible Indirect Call Sites”. The indirect call is
necessary for the attack to work - the sensitive function must be invoked through a function
pointer. In this way, the attacker can control both the function being executed, execve and
the data being passed into it, filename.
These two attacks highlight how memory corruption of select function arguments can
be used to achieve malicious behavior. It is clear that CFI techniques significantly raise
the bar for attackers, but remain insufficient. We explore a system in which select memory
safety can be combined with CFI for a more comprehensive defense through instruction level
capabilities. Our approach to CFI is to combine the literature on binary level provenance
tracking [130] to augment checks being performed by existing CFI solutions on calls, jumps,
and returns.
4.3 THREAT MODEL
We use the same threat model as works on CFI based defenses. That is, we assume the
attacker can read and write from arbitrary memory addresses. This can be achieved via
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common exploits. We assume that a CFI mechanism based on DSA points-to analysis is
being used on the binary and that an efficient shadow-stack is being used. The enforcement
mechanism presented in CCFI [131] can be used to achieve efficient enforcement of a fine-
grained CFI policy and shadow-stack.
Our work focuses on generating capabilities for select memory buffers, not primitive types.
Specifically, attacks like those presented in Control Flow Bending [25] and Control Ju-
jutsu [26] can be eliminated using the capabilities produced by our system. We are not
considering DOP attacks like those presented in [132].
4.4 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Our goal is to augment CFI with instruction level memory access capabilities to mitigate
Control Flow Bending and Control Jujutsu attacks. In this chapter, we explore creating
these capability lists for sensitive memory regions. We leverage a data provenance based
approach to produce instruction to memory access capability lists. Data provenance requires
tagging all memory writes, tracking memory access throughout program execution, and
finally, halting execution when an access deviates from a trusted data provenance graph for
a given buffer.
Direct application of data provenance for security poses a number of challenges. First,
tagging all memory writes imposes a large runtime overhead both on the CPU and in terms
of memory bandwidth. Second, on large code bases, the number of unique tags required to
build real world Data Flow Graphs (DFGs) explodes, either decreasing the accuracy of run
time enforcement through approximations or further increasing runtime overheads. Third,
in order to halt the program on a violation, the enforcement mechanism needs to be placed
at every memory write. Provenance enforcement requires full DFG traversal for every write,
further decreasing performance. Finally, a trusted source of provenance data is needed.
Our design addresses these challenges by making careful choices about which specific data
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buffers are tagged and when checks are performed. Specifically, we classify certain buffers
as sensitive memory and suggest performing checks at a sensitive use.
4.4.1 Identifying Sensitive Memory
Identifying which memory buffers are left vulnerable when combined with CFI is necessary
to limit the overhead of a combined memory safety + CFI approach. We define sensitive
functions as those that can expand the micro-service’s subject domain. From Chapter 3 we
know that system calls are used to create relationships with other system subjects. This
implies that memory regions that can be used to influence the behavior of system calls
are high-value targets. In fact, these are the exact memory regions that are the target of
Control Flow Bending or Control Jujutsu attacks. “Sensitive usages” as defined in Table 4.1
are functions whose memory arguments, when corrupted, lead to policy violating subject-
domains. Based on the discussion on relationships in Chapter 1, these are libc functions
and “sensitive memory” consists of the arguments to these functions.
4.4.2 Building Provenance Graphs
Having identified sensitive memory regions, a trusted provenance graph is needed so that
we can build capability lists. We have a number of options we can use to generate a prove-
nance graph for a given buffer. We could use alias analysis to determine which data structures
can be accessed by which functions. In large code bases such as Nginx, even the best alias
analysis (DSA) leads to an explosion in the DFG, making this approach untenable. Alterna-
tively, we could use symbolic execution and taint tracking to determine a DFG for a given
memory region. Existing symbolic execution and taint tracking methods focus on tracking
user input and the flow of that input under normal application execution. We want to
track internal data structures that are often never modified by an end-user during a normal
application flow. We need a reliable method to determine a DFG for arguments to internal
program functions.
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Instead, we rely on test suites and dynamic instrumentation to collect an accurate and
minimal DFG from which instruction level capabilities can be built. We instrument the
compiler to transparently inject a provenance engine to record this data during an oﬄine
phase. This data collection phase only has to be run once and can leverage high coverage
test suites that are common in application development today.
4.5 IMPLEMENTATION
Our implementation leverages the LLVM compiler infrastructure [133] which provides a
rich Intermediate Representation (IR) that can be modified with custom passes. A pass
operates on a unit of compilation (module, function, or code block) taking IR as input and
producing modified IR as output. Our provenance pass inserts a provenance engine by in-
strumenting all memory writes (store instructions in LLVM-IR) and memory allocation and
free events. At a sensitive use, the provenance graphs for the sensitive memory being used
are logged. This pass produces a binary to be used in an oﬄine data collection phase. To
ensure completeness of the provenance graphs, we also instrument “store-like” instructions
and functions. These include functions such as memcpy and memset that write to regions of
memory. In LLVM, setting a struct variable to the value of another struct is transformed
into a call to an LLVM implementation of memcpy, not a load + store combination. Ex-
tending tracking to include “store-like” operations captures this behavior. We also extend
the notion of store-like instructions to include system calls that write to userspace mem-
ory, the implementation of which is described in Section 4.5.4. We must also track free
operations to ensure that a sensitive use is not vulnerable to a Use-after-Free vulnerability.
Tracking free’s also allows us to prune provenance graphs to not include provenance from
other allocations at the same address, a problem that is particularly relevant when tracking
provenance of stack memory addresses as they have a high rate of reuse.
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4.5.1 Trusted Provenance Graph Generation
We assume that the developer has access to a high coverage test suite for the application
being instrumented. For Nginx, a Selenium [134] test suite could be used for a functional test
of a Wordpress deployment, allowing an instrumented binary to collect trusted provenance
graphs for sensitive memory.
We target infrastructure software; these types of packages are often written in low level
languages and are vulnerable to issues stemming from the lack of memory safety. Appli-
cations like web servers such as Nginx and Apache and Key/Value Stores like Redis and
Memchached are the cornerstone of many public facing application deployments and high-
light the micro-service approach to deployment. Functional test suites of the applications
built on top of these services exercise the functionality required to run on top of these
platforms.
We define sensitive memory regions as the memory containing the arguments being passed
to sensitive functions. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, we choose these to be libc functions
for now as these functions are the target of both attacks able to circumvent state of the
art CFI techniques and impact the service’s relationship with out system-level subjects. We
could easily extend this definition to include arguments to more functions or variables being
modified within a loop.
To track memory operations for provenance collection, we leverage LLVM’s rich inter-
mediate representation, allowing us to distill distinct memory operations and instrument
them directly. In this way, we can leverage provenance as a method for trusted capability
generation while exploring efficient enforcement mechanisms of the capability sets.
4.5.2 Provenance Event Types
We define four types of provenance events that are collected for a given memory address
addr.
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Events types are as follows:
• Use (U) - A use of an address addr. For our purposes, a use is defined as an invocation
of a sensitive function for which addr is an argument. Attributes: ID, addr, PID.
• Allocation (A) - An allocation returning an address addr. The program being instru-
mented may allocate memory on the heap or stack. The C runtime may also allocate
memory for program arguments and environment variables. Memory is also allocated
for literals in the .data region by the C runtime. Attributes: ID, addr, size, location
(HEAP, STACK or DATA), PID.
• Free (F ) - A free event. Free events are explicit for Heap memory and implicit on
function returns for Stack memory. Attributes: ID, addr, PID.
• Store (W ) - A store event during which there is a write to an address addr. Attributes:
ID, addr, PID, (source addr - optional).
Note that all events have an ID attribute. This ID must be unique for all event instances
logged to ensure the provenance building algorithm is complete as we discuss below.
4.5.3 Instruction & Function Tracking
Allocation and free events are tracked in a variety of ways. Stack allocations are tracked
by instrumenting all alloca instructions. When a function returns, we insert free events for
every address alloca’d during function execution into the provenance database. For heap
memory, we instrument the malloc and memalign instructions. We have not encountered
any sensitive memory regions lacking allocation events, but we can easily extend our method
to include other memory allocations such as anonymous mappings returned from the mmap
system call. Additionally, we have to consider allocations before a program’s main function
is invoked. Namely, the memory for the environ, argc, and argv symbols. The location and
initialization of the memory pointed to by these symbols is implementation dependent [135].
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To ease adoption, we avoid tracking memory operations in the target system’s libc. Instead,
we create allocation and store events for these symbols, if defined, upon invocation of main.
Internal memory allocation functions being used for memory pools require additional effort
on the developer’s part. Using pool allocators is common in the infrastructure software
we aim to harden. To work around this, we allow the developer to provide signatures of
internal memory allocation and free functions; this is standard practice for instrumenting
applications that use more than system calls for memory management [136]. We do not
currently support hardening of JIT compilers or dynamically managed environments.
Memory writes can be tracked by instrumenting LLVM’s store instruction. The instruc-
tion has three arguments, a destination pointer, a source variable, and the size of the
memory being moved. The destination is always a pointer; the source can be a basic type
or a pointer. We log all pointer arguments and the size so that we can track the entire
provenance graph of a given buffer. When size is greater than the size of basic types,
LLVM lowers the store operation into an LLVM specific memcpy implementation. We ex-
tend our definition of store events to include store-like function calls to track these store
operations. We also extend our definition to include libc function calls that match the
destination, source, size signature, such as strcpy, and treat these function invocations
as store events as well. Just as we did with memory allocation and free events, we al-
low the developer to provide signatures of functions that re-implement memcpy/store-like
operations.
Every function or instruction type must be assigned an ID that is unique and consistent
across builds. For example, all alloca instructions are assigned unique ID’s. These ID’s
can be used during an enforcement pass to limit the amount of instrumentation required
to enforce a given memory modification capability set. This ID should not be confused
with the runtime event-ID assigned to each event. The event-ID is unique to all events in
the system and is used to provide ordering, but instruction-ID’s are used to identify the
exact instruction, I used to modify a sensitive memory region,M. This information allows
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us to build the fine-grained capability lists discussed in Section 4.1. We build a pruned
list of capabilities that can be used for an Enforceable Provenance Graph as described in
Section 4.5.5.
4.5.4 Store-Like System Calls
We have defined store-like events to mean any instruction or function that can store data
in memory. This means that we must create store events for every system-call that writes to
userspace memory. Consider the system-call getsockopt in which the kernel writes socket-
options to a struct that lives in userspace. The read and recv system calls have similar
behavior. In every case, the kernel writes data to a buffer that has been allocated and
is manged by the userspace application. We want our provenance engine to be as widely-
applicable as possible. For this reason, we cannot require custom versions of libc or leverage
kernel modifications to track these store events that occur in code outside of the application.
To overcome this, we have integrated function signatures for store-like operations that occur
in the kernel or libc functions and they are logged immediately after the invocation of the
store-like function. In doing so, we had to handle additional layers of complexity stemming
from macro expansion that mangles libc function names. We must also gracefully handle
errors that the application developer may or may not have handled internally. For example,
a recv call may return −1 if the socket is interrupted during reading. In this case, we do
not create an entry in the provenance database.
System calls have a variety of ways of indicating the length of the userspace buffer being
passed into the kernel. Some calls leverage struct’s for which the size is known at compile
time. We have created an abstraction that allows us to easily handle system call cases as we
encounter them. Error handling using an abstraction to allow for easy addition of store-like
system calls as they are encountered has to contend with the fact that different system calls
use different basic types for error reporting. Developers must also specify a list of internal
functions that might match a given system call that should not be treated as such. For
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example, the ngx enable accept events should not be treated as an accept system call.
On the other hand the function accept4 should be treated like an accept system call just
as llvm.memset.p0i8.i64 should be treated as a memset. We require the developer to
list functions not to be treated as system calls so that we can easily support the variety
of naming schemes used when creating system call wrappers in libc and LLVM. We have
eased this process by creating a tool showing the developer a list of functions that match
system calls.
4.5.5 Enforceable Provenance Graphs
The provenance graph for a given addr is represented as a tuple Prov(addr) = 〈Aaddr,Saddr, Faddr〉
where:
• Aaddr is the allocation event for the address.
• Saddr is an ordered list of tuples numbered from 0 to n of the form:
[〈W 0addr, P rov(source addr0)〉...〈W naddr, P rov(source addrn)〉]. For a given tuple x, addr
must be in the range [destinationx, destinationx + sizex) for every store operation
W xaddr where source addr
x, destinationx, and sizex are elements in the W xaddr event
tuple as defined in Section 4.5.2. This tuple list contains every store event that wrote
to addr and the provenance of every source address in copy events. This recursive
definition provides the entire history of a single write event. The base case is a write
event that did not have a source address. More on this below.
• Faddr is the free event for the address.
An enforceable provenance graph must not include the final element in the tuple, namely
the free event Faddr. Verifying this constraint at runtime, during provenance logging, grantees
no Use-After-Free bugs in addresses pointing to sensitive memory.
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The provenance engine is robust, even when instrumenting complex production ready
software packages. This requires overcoming challenges with multi-threaded applications,
shared-memory, and numerous types of memory allocators.
Existing literature on memory protection assumes singled threaded applications and a
simpler model of C than that used in practice [123, 124]. In particular, these works assume
that malloc is the only way in which memory can be allocated. In the programs we evaluated,
numerous system calls are being used including mmap, malloc, and memalign. Each of these
calls must be instrumented in order to ensure that an allocation event, Aaddr, is in the
database at the time of use, Uaddr. For now, we are tracking malloc and memalign as they
are the only allocators being used for sensitive memory, easily verified via the lack of missing
allocation events for sensitive addresses. For each new allocation event type, we must assign
a unique identifier to the instruction type so that the specific allocation invocation can be
instrumented during an enforcement phase. We discuss the challenges with multi-threaded
applications and our robust memory layout in Sections 4.5.6 and 4.5.7 respectively.
The algorithm for parsing provenance engine output and translating the raw event stream
into individual provenance graphs for each usage must ensure the invariants outlined above
hold. These invariants drive both the parsing algorithm and the decision about which instruc-
tions or function invocations need logging and where to place compile time instrumentation
during our provenance collection pass as defined in Section 4.5.3. The full algorithm for
querying the provenance database for enforceable provenance graphs while handling the full
complexity of possibilities allowed by C is show in the Breadth-First-Search Algorithm 4.1,
described using the terms in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Terms used in Provenance Algorithms
Definition of Term
forkEvents Fork Event Table, indexed by Event ID
freeEvents Free Event Table, indexed by Event ID
allocEvents Allocation Event Table, indexed by Event ID
storeEvents Store and Copy Event Table, indexed by Event ID
storeEventsRev Store and Copy Event Table, indexed by Starting Ad-
dress
The algorithm has five main parts: (i) Locating the allocation for the sensitive memory
region (this step additionally checks to ensure the address is not vulnerable to a Use-After-
Free vulnerability), (ii) searching for all possible store events for the given address that occur
after the allocation event, (iii) filtering out events that did not occur within the relevant
processes (a full description of why this is necessary is in Section 4.5.6), (iv) masking out
store(-like) events, and finally, recursively following source addresses in copy events. In step
(iv) we mention event masking. Consider an an event with ID y that writes 1 byte to an
address x. If another event occurs in the future with ID y + t writing 1 or more bytes to
address x, the second event “masks” the first because any change from the first event will not
be visible to the application. We only perform single-event masking, meaning only events
that write out the same number of bytes to the same addresses will mask out other events. In
our tests, this is sufficient to mask out events and reduce the overhead of recursing. Future
work can explore combining events to produce masks. Consider a memset event that stores to
an entire buffer. The event could be masked by two subsequent events each of which writes
to half of the buffer. Note that getForkEventIDs referenced in Algorithm 4.1 is described
in full detail in Section 4.5.6.
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Algorithm 4.1 getProvFor
1: function getProvFor(address, event id, pid, size)
2: allocation← getAllocationFor(address, event id, pid)
3: forkEvents← getForkEvents(pid, event id)
4: possibleStores← storeEventsRev[address]
5: unfilteredStores← {}
6: for event in possibleStores do
7: startingAddr ← event.startingAddr
8: endAddr ← event.startingAddr + event.size
9: if startingAddr ≤ address then




14: if startingAddr > address then





20: filtered← filterPreAllocation(unfilteredStores, allocation)
21: forkAware← filterP ids(filtered, allocation, forkEvents)
22: events← maskEvents(forkAware)
23: for event in events do
24: if event.type ≡ COPY then





4.5.6 Cross-Process Memory Events
We also have to consider challenges to provenance tracking across multiple processes. To
enable cross-PID provenance we must add an additional fork event to the list of events being
tracked as defined in Section 4.5.2:
• Fork (K) - A fork system call. A tuple containing an event ID, PID (the parent pid),
and child pid.
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Additionally, the events defined in Section 4.5.2 must be augmented with the PID in
which the event was generated. Consider a simple multi-threaded program in which a parent
process allocates memory, writes to it, forks, and the child subsequently uses the memory.
Tracking fork events allows us to easily identify cross-PID allocation and store events for a
given address. This is common in production software. Consider the fork() + execve()
pattern in which the parent forks and the child process executes a new binary. The arguments
to execve are allocated and setup by the parent process.
PID 1
alloc x      | 1
store x      | 2
fork (ppid-1)| 3
PID 1
store x      | 4
fork (ppid-1)| 6
PID 3
store x      | 8
fork (ppid-3)| 9
PID 2
store x       | 5
sensitive use |14
PID 1
store x      | 7
PID 3
store x       |10
sensitive use |15
PID 4
store x       |11
sensitive use |13
Figure 4.1: Provenance Across Fork Events
Figure 4.1 shows the full complexity of cross-PID memory events. Each box in the figure
represents an instruction stream in a given process; on the left is the instruction type coupled
with an ever growing event-id on the right. Consider a single process that allocates an address
x, followed by various store(-like) events across processes after the original process has forked.
Sensitive usages of the address x at events 13 and 14 highlight challenges in querying for
cross-fork events. The enforceable provenance graph for sensitive use 14 is shown in red.
It is fairly easy to reason about the events making up the graph. The situation is more
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complex when parsing the provenance data to produce the graph for address x and event 13,
shown in blue. Events span multiple processes and must filter out irrelevant event-ID’s. For
example, PID-3 has a store event with ID 10 and which is less than the ID of the sensitive
use, 13, and in a parent process. Despite being in a parent, event 10 should not be included
because it occurs after the fork event 9. Algorithm 4.2 is the algorithm for identifying the
list of fork event-ID’s that should be used as bounds when querying for store-events in each
parent-PID.
Algorithm 4.2 getForkEventIDs
1: function getForkEventIDs(pid, event id)
2: forkIds = {}
3: childP id← pid
4: childId← event id
5: for i = forkEvents.size()− 1, i >= 0, i−− do
6: event← forkEvents[i]
7: childP idi ← event.childP id
8: currId← event.eventId
9: if childP idi ≡ childP id && currId < childId then
10: childP id← childP idi
11: childId← currId





4.5.7 Runtime Provenance Engine Memory Layout
The runtime memory layout of our provenance engine is dictated by the need to handle
cross-PID tracking while allowing unique ID’s be generated for events as they occur. To
do this, we produce a transaction system based on shared-memory for writing into the
provenance database. The engine for writing into the database lives in shared memory, along
with a locking mechanism and enough memory to store event transaction data before it is
written to the provenance database. This design is shown in Figure 4.2. The instrumented
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application interacts with the provenance engine through an Inter-Process-Communication
(IPC) mechanism leveraging a semaphore in shared-memory. The LLVM-pass inserts a
function invocation to allocate and initialize the shared-memory region before any other
application code runs. This ensures the shared-memory is allocated and the address is
accessible to any threads that the application may create throughout execution.





















Figure 4.2: Provenance Engine Memory Layout
Event insertion into the provenance database at runtime occurs through a series of function
calls, one for every event type described in Section 4.5.2. Each function’s behavior is very
similar: (i) Get a handle to the shared-memory region, (ii) grab the global lock, (iii) write
data to transaction structs, (iv) signal the provenance thread via a semaphore. At this
point, the lock is held and no other event can be written to the provenance database until
the transaction is completed by the provenance thread.
The provenance thread waits on a semaphore in shared memory. Upon grabbing the
semaphore, the provenance thread is responsible for taking one of a few actions relating to the
provenance database. It can either write transaction data for an event or run Algorithm 4.1
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to produce the enforceable provenance graph for a given sensitive use. The provenance
database itself lives on the heap in the provenance thread; all access to this database must
use IPC between application threads and the provenance thread. Once the action completes,
the provenance thread unlocks the lock that was grabbed at the beginning of the transaction,
allowing other events or actions to be taken.
4.6 EXAMPLE PROVENANCE GRAPHS
We have evaluated our provenance engine on the Nginx webserver. Nginx uses a master-
worker process model for handling requests. All requests are processed within a worker
thread while the master thread is responsible for reading the configuration file and spinning
up workers. This is only one threading model an application might use; others could use
threads that split work evenly across threads. In any case, the forking methods described
in Section 4.5.6 and the memory layout discussed in Section 4.5.7 provide an abstraction
that allows us to easily reason about provenance regardless of the design of the instrumented
application.
We have also provided signatures for the store-like copy operation in Nginx that re-
implements libc strncpy functionality, namely the ngx strncpy function. Doing this allows
the provenance graphs to track the relationship between source and destination addresses
passed to the function, information that would otherwise be lost. Additionally, in future work
we will leverage these provenance graphs to enforce instruction level capabilities. Treating
custom copy functions as store-like operations means that enforcement can be placed after
the function invocation instead of after the single store operation that occurs in a tight-loop
within the ngx strncpy function itself which can reduce overhead.
Nginx was started with the command nginx -c /etc/nginx/nginx.conf -g "daemon
off;". The provenance graph for sensitive use 96 with event-ID 11508 is show in Listing 4.1.
For each sensitive use, we log the provenance of any memory buffer arguments. In this case,
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there is only a single memory buffer holding a \0 terminated C-string which is 22 bytes.
Each argument is given a number by the provenance engine, so this first and only argument
is numbered 0. A name may appear after the number identifier if a variable name is still
present within LLVM at compile time. We can see that this argument was allocated in the
middle (732 bytes in) of a large allocation from a memalign call. The memalign has been
assigned a unique ID, 512:1:1 indicating the function, block, and individual instruction at
which the memalign occurs in the LLVM IR. Future work can leverage this ID to enforce the
capability lists at runtime. The memory region was written to by a single copy instruction
of CUSTOM type, indicating that the store-like operation stems from a developer provided
function signature. Finally, the source of the copy event was allocated by the C-Runtime
before the invocation of main. Specifically, the source was the 3rd argument to the micro-
service, argv[2], which was the name of the configuration file used when starting Nginx. It
is clear to see that this is the open call running in the master thread to open the configuration
file as Nginx starts. This defines the proper data flow for sensitive use 96.
Listing 4.1: Example open Provenance Graph
Event id : 11508 <open64>: 96 PID : 506
Event id : 11509 0/ : <0x10c995c> / S i z e : 22 PID : 506
A l l o ca t i o n : Event ID => 9787 / S ta r t i ng Addr => 10 c9680 / S i z e => 16384 /
Pid => 506 / O f f s e t f o r Arg Addr => 732 / KIND => MEMALIGN / MEMALIGN ID =>
5 1 2 : 1 : 1
COPY: Event ID => 10070 / DST Address : 10 c995c / S i z e : 22 / SRC Addr :
7 f f e ea9b7e81 / Pid : 506 / Copy ID : 292 : 11 : 1/ Locat ion : HEAP / Kind : CUSTOM
A l l o c a t i on : Event ID => 3 / S ta r t i ng Addr => 7 f f e ea9b7e81 /
S i z e => 21 / Pid => 506 / O f f s e t f o r Arg Addr => 0 / KIND => CRT /
CRT ID => argv [ 2 ]
We have also listed another provenance graph from the sigsuspend sensitive use in List-
ing 4.2. This listing highlights the need to treat certain system calls that write to userspace
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memory as store-like events. The final event in the provenance graph is a call to sigprocmask
that modifies the struct buffer that is then passed into sigsuspend.
Listing 4.2: Example sigsuspend Provenance Graph
Event id : 312400 <s igsuspend >: 206 PID : 477
Event id : 312401 0/ s e t : <0x7 f f f 074c9800> / S i z e : 128 PID : 477
A l l o ca t i o n : Event ID => 311417 / S ta r t i ng Addr => 7 f f f 0 7 4 c 9 8 0 0 / S i z e => 128 /
Pid => 477 / O f f s e t f o r Arg Addr => 0 / KIND => Al loca / Al loca ID => 6 0 9 : 1 : 8
STORE: Event ID => 311427 / DST Address : 7 f f f 0 7 4 c 9 8 0 0 / S i z e : 8 / SRC Addr : 0 /
Pid : 477 / Store ID : 6 0 9 : 1 : 1 / s igprocmask / Locat ion : STACK / Kind : SYS CALL
The examples listed in this section demonstrate our robust provenance engine. We are
able to track the source of memory modifications throughout program execution and log
them so they can be used as capability lists.
4.7 RELATED WORK
In this section we discuss the limitations of CFI methods which highlight the need for
instruction level capability lists. We also discuss work on runtime provenance engines that
have traditionally been used in audit systems.
4.7.1 Control Flow Integrity
CFI [122] attempts to mitigate ROP [115] and JOP [116] attacks by enforcing a CFG.
These approaches have two steps: 2) CFG generation and 2) CFG enforcement. Early CFI
approaches generated a coarse-grained CFG that categorized code pointers into only two
distinct categories: one for functions whose address is taken and another for return-address
locations (code addresses immediately following a call-site) [122]. Approaches to CFI have
been steadily adding more ways to classify code addresses. CCFIR [125] has up to 3 different
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classifications. More recent approaches can support up to 280 unique classes [137], but the
authors do not discuss how an effective CFG could be built that supports such a high degree
of unique classification. The coarse grained approach to generating CFG’s is ineffective as
an attack deterrent as highlighted by numerous attacks [126, 138, 139]. Type based CFG
generation can be more effective at reducing the number of gadgets available to attackers.
Type based solutions require application level changes, thus fall back on function arity [140],
limiting the number of classifications available to call-sites and indirect branches.
The attacks on coarse-grained CFI [126, 138, 139] necessitated the development of more
fine-grained approaches. Fine-grained approaches must address two concerns: they should
be able to support a large number of classifications and should be based on more precise
static analysis; preferably, they should also incorporate dynamic run-time information to
augment enforcement decisions. Practical Context-Sensitive CFI [141] augments custom
static analysis performed on a binary with run-time information to reduce valid code-address
targets. The authors further evaluate a hypothetical deployment of ideal static analysis based
on DSA [127] for a further reduction in gadgets. Cryptographically Enforced Control Flow
Integrity [137] introduces a hardware accelerated enforcement mechanisms that supports up
to 280 different classifications/labels and works in run-time information such as the location
of the pointer holding the code-address, but only suggest leveraging existing CFG generation
methods.
4.7.2 Provenance
Traditionally, provenance has been used as a runtime audit system [130, 142, 143]. Bates
et al. focus on instrumenting the Linux kernel to produce W3C compliant provenance graphs,
capturing the relationships between system level subjects. Our provenance engine works at
a more fine grained level by determining provenance at the instruction level. CamFlow is
another provenance engine that works as a modification to the Linux kernel [143]. We see
these works as complimentary. Our system could be run along side these to augment their
96
logs with fine-grained provenance data. Spade is a generic system for storing provenance
from a variety of sources [130]. Again, our provenance engine for C applications could com-
pliment their work by providing an additional source of provenance data for their distributed
provenance engine.
4.8 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have presented a provenance engine to be inserted into micro-services
via a modified compiler. This allows us to instrument and track provenance of memory that
will impact the relationships micro-services create with other subjects in cloud computing
systems as shown in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1. Using our model of security, we are able to
limit the amount of memory that gets classified as being “security sensitive” to only the
memory that has the ability to influence the service’s subject-domain, namely, memory used
to modify the behavior of system calls.
To produce these fine-grained capabilities, our provenance engine must be able to track the
source of memory allocation, modification, and copy events. To support the complexities of
real world software, we must allow developers to extend the notion of individual event types
to include developer defined functions such as internal pool allocators or custom versions of
memcpy-like functions.
Furthermore, we must track memory modification events that occur outside of the appli-
cation itself. Specifically, memory can be modified by the kernel by passing userspace buffers
to system-calls. To support treating these calls as store events, we instrument the system
calls that write to userspace memory so that their writes appear in the provenance database.
Finally, we have to handle the complexity steaming from cross-fork allocation events.
Having handled these event types, we are able to produce the fine-grained capability lists
linking individual instructions to the relationships they are capable of influencing.
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Chapter 5: Summary
In this dissertation, we have provided a novel approach to micro-service security by consid-
ering subjects and relationships from every layer of the stack. We apply Take-Grant across
every layer simultaneously, allowing us to consider passive information transfer stemming
from stateful hardware, trustworthy relationship monitoring at the system-call boundary,
and fine-grained relationship modification at the instruction level.
5.1 CROSS-LAYER TAKE-GRANT
We leverage a Take-Grant model of security that allows for straightforward reasoning of
capabilities. We apply this model to micro-services in a cloud environment and leverage it
in a variety of ways outlined below.
5.1.1 Passive Attacks
We start in Chapter 2 by extending the notion of a “subject” to include stateful hardware
resources that until recently have not been considered a point of information flow. In this
dissertation, we focus on information flow stemming from shared caches, but the technique
can be applied to other hardware resources. Having added the cache to our model of security,
we can begin to look for ways to apply capabilities to limit access to the shared resources.
We introduce the notion of security domains in which processes belonging to a single
organization or security-level within an organization can be grouped. We then introduce
a cache-access capability that can only be held by a single security domain at a time. To
reduce the impacts of of enforcing such a capability on a large shared cache, we leverage
Intel’s CAT to partition the LLC and then apply the capability within a single isolated
region consisting of an isolated cache region and any number of logical processors.
We enforce the cache-access capability through the use of strict-co-scheduling of processes
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belonging to the security domain holding the capability in the isolated region. Transfer of the
capability to another domain requires revoking the cache-access capability, pausing execution
in the isolated region, then performing state cleansing to remove residual information before
granting the cache-access capability to another security domain.
Our approach to adding capabilities to access shared-caches highlights how capabilities
can be leveraged to eliminate information flow due to stateful hardware. Passive attacks will
continue to remain a threat to cloud computing until capabilities can be effectively applied
to all shared hardware. We encourage hardware vendors to expose other MSRs allowing
explicit operating system control over these stateful resources.
5.1.2 Active Attacks at the System Level
In Chapter 3 we extend active monitoring mechanisms to be more resilient when generating
logs of relationship events between micro-services and other system level subjects. Subjects
at this level include files being accessed and binaries being executed. Leveraging a novel
probe insertion mechanism, we are able to produce a trustworthy log.
Leveraging the trustworthy log of system level relationships, we are able to create both
a policy recording mechanism and IDS that determines when system-level capabilities have
been violated.
Monitoring relationships at the systems-level exposes a number of attacks, such as those
trying to read system files that could expose confidential user information. Even so, relation-
ship monitoring at this level dictates that attacks must first go outside of the micro-service
before it can be detected. For earlier detection of active attacks, we look toward fine grained
capability mechanism for cloud application.
5.1.3 Fine Grained Active Attacks
To address the limitations of coarse grained detection of active attacks, we look at how
relationships are influenced within an application in Chapter 4. Relationships are built using
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system-calls; instructions that can modify the behavior or the specific subject the system-call
acts on become part of the security model.
We leverage a custom provenance engine to determine instruction level provenance of
memory that is being passed into system calls. These memory regions define the files that
are opened or executed along with the sockets that are opened. These are only examples
of the kind of behaviors that the arguments to these functions can control. It is clear that
system-level relationships are governed by these memory regions, thus the instructions that
modify these regions are a logical point at which to apply capabilities.
By tracking the provenance for these memory regions, we can produce instruction level
capabilities to limit an attackers ability to hijack control flow and create untrusted rela-
tionships between the micro-service and other subjects on the system. Chapter 4 highlights
the challenges with producing capability lists at such a fine granularity. It is clear that for
robust security, instruction level capabilities must be taken into account.
5.2 CONCLUSION
In order to have the best possible security in cloud environments, a model of security
must include subjects from every layer of the application stack. These include resources
as opaque as hardware caches, as coarse grained as system-level function calls, and as fine
grained as instruction level memory access capabilities. Having a robust model for security
allows researchers and practitioners to more easily reason about the relationships that are
created between subjects in the system. Having identified the source of these relationships,
capabilities can be defined to govern them. We have highlighted this method throughout
this dissertation. Moving forward, security must be holistic and consider a wide-range of
resources and the complex relationships between them.
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